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PREFACE
Problem identification and solving in the realm of political
conflict requires that each actor respond by using his or her own prescribed set of values.

There are legal requirements that determine, to

a degree, the extent to which these values may be implemented.

These

requirements may be general in their scope or particular in their
application to a given circumstance.

Such a specific application may be

noted in the case of the laws dealing with elections in the state of
Illinois.
In Illinois, if you are a citizen; if you meet age and residency
requirements; if you are registered; if you are in the vicinity of your
precinct polling place on election day; you may vote in a primary and/or
general. election. 1 On the presumption that a major goal of a political
party is to elect its members to public office,2 ·one would be safe in
assuming that it would be to the advantage of the political parties in
the state to ensure the fulfillment of all of these

11

ifs. 11

Over the years, students of politics have developed numerous
ways to measure attempts to fulfill these requisities.

Eligibility and

registration statistics and voting indices are available and they can be

1
state of Illinois Election Laws, October 22, 1973, Sections:
3.:.1; 7-43
2Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:
Harper, 1957)
iii

evaluated by both simple and elaborate techniques.

The analysis of this

type of data has spawned questions which have been dealt with, to some
degree of satisfaction, by political analysts (i.e., voting patterns in
terms of education levels, SES, race, religion, and ethnic background).
To my knowledge, there has been no effort to evaluate the apparently
deliberate attempt to fragment a specific element of a definable urban
community and thus prevent it from developing a cohesive voting bloc that
could presumably rival the existing power structure.

At its base, this

would appear to be the nature of the study at hand.

But what I intend

to review involves deeper questions; questions of legality and misuse of
public trust as a result of the phenomenon known as

11

gerrymandering. 11

The immediate concern of this study is political power in relation to electoral representation of the Spanish-speaking and black
minorities in Chicago.

The approach involves a consideration of the

redistricting ordinance that was adopted by the Chicago City Council on
Novenber 5th, 1973, 3 and what effect this ordinance had on the wards'
populations and subsequently the nature of the electorate.
The consequences of a political action that affect the individuals in a given community in reference to their elected officials may be
viewed from two distinct perspectives.

The action may be examined in

terms of the effect on the individual ward (in relation to the potential
for democratic elections), and also may be examined in reference to the
effect on the city as a whole (given that the individual ward is part of
3Chicago Municipal Code, Section: 4, pars. 12-64

iv

the governing structure of the city).

While the city is certainly more

than the sum of the fifty wards, it must be noted that within the governing structure, each individual ward has a function to serve insofar as
it is as equally represented by an alderman as any and all of the remaining wards.

In this sense, any ward that is gerrymandered affects the

equality of representation on the entire City Council.
Obviously, any connection between a single gerrymandered ward
and the assumption that the city as a whole has suffered from undemocratic practices would be a tenuous one at best.

For that matter, two,

three, or even five wards would not necessarily prove a correlation.
However, in the event that the effect of a single incidence of gerrymandering did indeed affect the surrounding wards adversely, one could
begin to establish a correlation.

Furthermore, if this relationship

between the gerrymandered ward and its surrounding wards were to affect
the nature of the leadership in the city (by increasing the opportunity
for an individual or party to win the election), a possible conclusion
might be that the ability to gerrymander may have great influence on the
continued election of certain members of the existing power structure.
In the text of this analysis I will establish that certain wards
were gerrymandered.

I will further establish the relationship between

this action and those who control the apparatus for redistricting.

While

the intentions of those actors involved in the gerrymandering can only
be imputed, the function served by the action itself can be examined.
Whether or not a correlation between gerrymandering and the continued existence of the machine can be ·established is perhaps best left

v

to history, but for the moment the objective is to replace as many of
these

11

ifs 11 as possible with actual data.

There would appear to be five

major concerns that should be approached in order to accomplish this:
First, the problem must be defined along with its ramifications.
gerrymandering will be placed in its historical perspective.

Second,

From this

point, the third approach will be a study of gerrymandering in its
political context, that is, Chicago.

Fourth, the consequences of the

action of gerrymandering and their relationship with the political power
structure in Chicago will be explicated.

The fifth and final step will

be to draw any possible conclusions from the establishment of this
rel at ions hip.

vi
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-CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Urban analysis may at times become a tedious endeavor unless one
is able to define its parameters.

Because this analysis involves a

definite political structure as well as what may prove to be the result
of informal policy, both the structure (the Democratic Party and its
relationship with Chicago city government) and the policy (gerrymandering)
must be defined and placed within the context of the question at hand.
That is,to say, when examining gerrymandering in Chicago, the role of
11

political

machine 11 and governmental development in the city as well as

any prior history of gerrymandering become essential to defining the
parameters of the struggle between the machine and the rights of the
minority.
Attempting to identify all the actors in this conflict, at least
individually, would have questionable value.
that the

11

Despite the understanding

machine 11 in Chicago is not entirely monolithic--that it is

comprised of several interests which play a definite role in this
struggle--it becomes necessary to refer to the Democratic Party as an
approxi ma ti on of a single entity.
this in his description of the

11

Edward C. Banfield gives reason to

machine 11 in Chicago and its

11

boss: 11

..• (a machine is a party of a particular kind; one which relies
characteristically upon attraction of material rewards rather than
enthusiasm for political principles) ... As party 'boss', the mayor
plays the principle part in making up the lticket 1 • One who defies

1

2

his control may be 'dumped' at the next primary, and one who is
loyal to him may be chosen for rapid advancement. In addition, he
has a vast amount of patronage at his disposal; he can give or withhold the hundreds of jobs without which most ward committeemen could
not maintain their positions. Without being dishonest himself, he
can regulate the 'take' of those who profit from their connection
with politics. Having control of the police force, he can decide
how rigorously laws are to be enforced.I
In more precise terms, machine
11

11

refers to that political party

with a virtual monopoly over political resources which distributes
tangible incentives in exchange for votes.2 It is bureaucratic in
structure with a clearly defined hierarchy.

Like any other bureaucracy,

self-maintenance is very high on its list of priorities.3 Yet, despite
strong resistance from regular party bosses,
11

11

the twentieth century in

the United States has been marked by an end to the one-party rule of its
big cities (City of Chicago excepted).
The question of governmental development in terms of the demise
of the machine and the rise of reform has been well studied from the
social science perspective.

There have been four major theories con-

cerning governmental development in urban America.

The conventional
11

wisdom" of the field, which may be described as Assimilation Theory,
includes the writings of Edward Banfield4 and Robert Dahl.5 They trace
lEdward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York:
Press, 1961) p. 237

The Free

2Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York:
Random House, 1966) p. 115
3Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York:

The Free Press,

1962} p. 189

4Banfield, Political Influence p. 237
5Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut:
1961)

Yale University Press,

3

governmental development in terms of demographic changes that dialectically lead to the destruction of the machine.
When Robert Dahl did his study of New Haven, it was viewed by
many in the academic community as an accurate study of democracy and
power in an American city. It was hailed by many as a 11 classic 11 study
of pluralist theory of local power structure.
The study expresses the view that governmental development is a
function of demographic changes.

That is to say, the changes in the

social composition of the electorate (e.g. SES, education, ethnicity)
produce_ a measurable change in the nature of government.

"Accompanying

and probably causing this (demographic) change ... appears to be a profound alteration in the way political resources are distributed .•. 116
Dahl goes on to say that the main evidence " ... for the shift from oligarchy to pluralism is found in changes in the social characteristics of
elected officials ... 117
For Banfield,8 increasing wealth, upward mobility, and the loss
of ethnic i denti fi ca ti on with machine can di dates are the keys to the
eventual destruction of the machine 1n Chicago.

These factors were to

precipitate a "good government" consciousness that would lead the machine
to reform itself, or the voters to eventually

11

vote the rascals out."

Coupled with the movement towards the suburbs, only a small electorate was
6Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (Connecticut:

1961) p. 11

Yale University Press,

7rbid.
Bsanfield, Political Influence (See especially Chapter VIII for
ensuing argument.)

4

to be left in the inner city machine heartland, causing a loss of the
machine's voter base.

And yet, nearly fifteen years after Banfield's

study, on November 5, 1974 and again on February 25, 1975, the candidates
slated by Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Democratic machine won overwhelming victories.
While this cursory recounting of the main elements of Assimilation Theory (or for that matter any of the other theories that are to
follow) does not begin to do it justice, the main intention here is to
acknowledge the existence of these theories and to suggest an alternative
theory that may well explain a significant portion of the success of the
machine in Chicago.
The second theory that seeks to explain why reform occurs can
best be labeled the "muckraker theory." Held most widely by political
journalists (in Chicago, Mike Royko of the Chicago Daily News is a prime
example 9), the process involves a "picking off" of the top leadership of
the machine through investigation of their activities.

Often times the

process involves the combined efforts of a journalist and a civic-minded
organization (such as the Better Government Association in Chicago).
Through investigative reporting, a journalist can uncover
questionable activities on the part of the leaders of the machine.

If

sufficient incriminating evidence is found, national, state or county
prosecutori al staffs may investigate through a grand jury indictment.
Once the main members of the machine have been eliminated through prosecu9Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York:
New Arre ri can Library, 1971)

The

5

tion and conviction, the machine's structure would crumble.

This

approach to reform was believed to be the reason for the fall of the
political "bosses" in Kansas City and Boston.10
The third main theory, most highly represented by James Q. Wilson,
suggests that reform stems from an internal struggle for power that grows
out of the development of "competitive parties. 11 11 According to Wilson,
reform occurs when reform clubs within the party develop and create
competition for resources.

Perhaps the most classic example of this was

the ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall in New York in 1961.
structure in Manhattan had undergone a fundamental change.

The class

Reform clubs,

which had periodically developed before the change, now began to organize
among the new middle class inhabitants.

It became apparent to them that

the party could not be reformed by any outside effort.

Together with

several minor scandals, this loss of Tammany's voting strength (which
was rooted in the lower class and immigrant families) allowed the reform
clubs to mount a campaign sufficient enough to oust Tammany leaders.
The fourth theory suggests that reform occurs when a repressed
faction of the city makes i deo l ogi cal demands on a machine wh i ch forces
it to collapse because of its inability to deal with such demands.

Peter

lOPendergast and Curley were the respective "bosses" in these
cities. In 1939 the Democratic machine in Kansas City collapsed after
Pendergast s conviction due to the hounding of the press and the Department of Justice 1 s diligence in pursuing tax evasion claims resulting
from a bribe. For further discussion see: Alfred Steinberg~·The Bosses
(New York: McMillan and Co., 1972)
1

llJames Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962) See especially Chapter II for an account of the
ultimate destruction of Tammany Hall.

6

Knauss12 and David Protess13 both express this concept in their analyses
of the machine in the city of Chicago.

It is their contention that once

ideological demands are made, the machine will be forced to give way.
Demands placed on the machine of an ideological nature (such as "civil
rights") cannot be converted into patronage and therefore cannot be dealt
with in the fashion that is usually employed by a machine.
cannot be disaggregated.

Ideology

Even the less controversial areas such as air

pollution must be dealt with in a way that the machine,

~machine,

cannot profit from.14
Each of these theories outlines either the process or conditions
for the demise of the machine, noting that when and if certain conditions
are met, the likelihood of the ma.chine's continued power is extremely
limited.

By preparing a chronicle of elements that lead to the fall of

one machine or listing the elements that are antithetical to the very
existence of any machine, these theories would hope to establish a basis
for predicting the fall of the machine in Chicago.
There is evidence that conditions that would tend to validate
these theories do exist in Chicago.

There is indeed a move to the

suburbs as Banfield suggests, the formation of reform clubs as Wilson
suggests and ideological demands are being made as Knauss and Protess
12Peter Knauss, Chicago:· One Party State (Champaign, Illinois:
Stipes Publishjng Co., 1970)
13oavi d Protess, "Banfield' s Chi ca go Revisited," Socia 1 Service
Review (June, 1974)
14Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: NonDecision Making in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971)

7

have stated.

There are several other indices such as ticket-splitting,

primary challenges, the emersion of ideologues, to some extent, the
"Americanization of the immigrant 11 15 and the convictions of several top
city officials that would indicate the presence of conditions for the
demise of the machine.

But the machine still remains in control of

almost every local office.

Republications and independents hold less

than a half-dozen seats in the City Council.

There must be a tool avail-

able to the machine to continue its hold over the elected positions in
the city of Chicago; a strategy that has enabled the machine to overcome
the forces suggested by these theories.

This is where I believe the use

of gerrymandering becomes an important part of the machine's efforts to
retain its control.

I will now proceed to a brief review of the liatera-

ture on the subject in order to lay the basis for this claim.
The greatest amount of work on the general subject of reapportionment has been confined to the levels of national and state
legislative districts and school district boundaries.

It has not been

on the local level, where the influence of the machine can be noted.
Rather, it has grown out of the case of Baker v Carr. 16 Gordon Baker
and Robert Luce17 have dealt with the area concerning legislative redistricting in light of the Supreme Court's decision of 11 one man, one vote 11
15 Eugene Lewis, The Urban Political System (New York:
Rhinehart and Winston, 1973)

Holt,

16Baker v Carr 389 U.S. 186; S.Ct. 691 (1962)
17Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York:
Random House, 1963); Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930)

8

and the nature of legislative principles (respectively) in great detail.
Along with Karl Bosworth and Andrew Hackerl8 their contributions have
centered on the legal implications and.political consequences of these
aspects of gerrymandering.

Because they have focused on state and

national levels, none of these authors have approached the subject in
terms of the political

adva~tages

and/Or disadvantages and social conse-

quences that can be realized through the maneuvering of ·local legislative
districts.

Because the literature of the field does not examine gerry-

mandering (in any detail) in an urban machine setting, both citizens and
students of politics are faced with the problem of the absence of adequate
information.
Charles Fishman, who has prepared a manual for black lawyers who
wish to fight racial gerrymandering, writes:

"This report was printed ...

in the hope that the wide dissemination of this information would be of
value to the black community as it seeks to assert its rights in the
po 1i ti cal arena. 19
11

The emphasis in the book is on legal considerations used in combating racial discrimination that is manifested through discriminatory
reapportionment practices.

Fishman's objective is to acquaint black

leaders with the signs of gerrymandering, the effect it has on the black
community, and to arm them with the legal elements necessary to combat
18 Karl A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments 11 in· The· 48

States: Their Tasks as Polic Makers and Administrators (New York:
o u ia mvers1 y,
; n rew acer, ongress1ona Districting:
The Issue of Equal Representation (Washi_ngton: Brooki_ngs Institute,
1963)
19charles Fishman~ Rea ortionment and Racial Ger manderin
(Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1971

--9

it.

After Fishman initially states that he feels the power of the

black community is in jeopardy because of gerrymandering, he refrains
from considering any further political implications.

It is from the

perspective of these other implications that the balance of this study
will view governmental development in Chicago.

Political aspects such

as gerrymandering's effect on the nature of the City Council, the continued role of the machine, and the advancement of the political career
of certain Chicago politicians as well as the consequences of these
actions must be considered. When examined in concert, these considerations present the overall effect that gerrymandering has had on the city.
Any further discussion of these political implications and
social consequences of gerrymandering should be preceded by an examination of the terms and e lerrents that are to be considered.

Their

description will become the groundwork upon which the relationship
between gerrymandering and power in Chicago will be established.

It is

through this relationship that the effects of gerrymandering can best be
viewed.

11

strategy will be referred to as "confinement, and the second as
11

11

dispersal. 11

(These two strategies of gerrymandering will be discussed

in greater detail in Chapter V.)
It is di ffi cult to determine, even approximately, what percent-

age of the overall control of the machine involves the actual use of
gerrymandering.

It is the express intention of this study to establish

gerrymandering as an important tool (along with patronage and other forms
of perquisites) in the machine's efforts to retain control in the city
of Chicago.

Because of the difficulty involved in identifying the actual

extent of the role of gerrymandering, and in light of the fact that it
is a tool employed by the machine to alter the social makeup of a particular community, the social consequences of the act of gerrymandering
(not just its motivations) must be taken into account.
The functional approach, 1 as a theoretical framework for examining and clarifying the relationship between actions and their social
consequences,2 allows for the consideration of the role of gerrymandering
in terms of its effect on the community in relation to the establishment
(or prevention of) equitable representation.

Furthermore, a functional

analysis of the role of gerrymandering in the maintenance of machine
control in Chicago provides an explanation of a social action that may
not be empirically proven.

That is to say, data can only respond to the

questions asked of it and the data establishing gerrymanderi_ng in Chicago
lRobert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (reved.;
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp. 19-84
2Jbi d.

.....
12
will not respond, of itself, to the question 11 \'1hy? 11 Because one could
not be present to examine the motivations for gerrymandering, it becomes
necessary to examine the consequences (both manifest and latent) of this
social action and then impute possible reasons for them.
In any analysis, the process or social action to be examined
must be clearly defined and placed within the context in which it is to
be analyzed.

In this case, the process is referred to as gerrymandering

and the following definition and etymology of the word will help to
establish a basic working knowledge of the term:
To gerrymander is to di vi de a state, county, city, etc. into
sections, election districts or other civil divisions in an unnatural
and unfair way with a view to give a political party an advantage
over its opponent, or for some other improper purpose.
In 1812 while Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts, the
Republican legislature redistributed the districts in such a way that
the shapes of the towns forming a single district in Essex County
gave to the district a somewhat dragon-like contour. This was indicated on a map of Massachusetts which Benjamin Russell, an ardent
Federalist and editor of the 11 Centennal 11 , hung up over the desk in
his office. The celebrated painter, Gilbert Stuart, coming in to
the office one day and observing the uncouth figure, added with his
pencil a head, wings and claws and exclaimed, 11 That will do for a
salamander. 11 11 Better say a gerry-mander! 11 growled the editor; and
the outlandish name, thus duly coined, soon came into general
currency. (See illustration on following page.)3
With the etymology of.the word developing out of a confrontation
in Massachusetts, it is ironic that the first known cry for its abolition
also originated there.

At the Massachusetts State Constitutional Conven-

tion of 1853, Charles Francis Adams, a delegate from Boston contended:
I maintain that the moment a majority in a Republic assumes to draw
a distinction with the intent that certain men shall be enabled to
3The etymology and definition of gerrymandering 11 is derived
from, Webster's New International Dictionary (1958)
11

--13
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14
enjoy twice or thrice the amount of political power which an equal
number of other nen possess, that is the hour when tyranny begins ..• 4
Something as intricate as this piece of "political skulduggery 115
demands an equally intricate combination of professionals to achieve the
intended results.

By its very definition, the machine has the necessary

strength as well as personnel to achieve this complicated end.

But, are

the forces of assimilation actually working against any attempt to gerrymander on racial and ethnic grounds, forces that would appear to be able
to overcome

~strength

or combination of personnel?

In the review of the literature, the social scientists
assimilation was discussed.

1

view of

Perhaps additional insight into the ques-

tion of assimilation's role in counteracting the machine's influence can
be gained from an examination adopting the ethnic group's point of view.
Cynthia Enloe•s6 analysis of ethnicity deals with the concept of nationstate and the role of ethnicity, but a great deal of what she says would
seem just as applicable to the city of Chicago.

She denies that as a

nation-state develops (or in this case, if I may be permitted the
analogy, the city of Chicago), ethnicity attenuates.

Concerning the

role of the ethnic group itself in the process of assimilation, Enloe
says:
••• "Thou shalt preserve thy integrity." This is not so with ethnic
groups, which are constantly caught up in debates whether they should
4Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (Boston:
Co., 1930) p. 25
Gambi t

11

(Boston:

Houghton Mifflin

5Robert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's
in Saturday Review (June 3, 1972) p. 42 ·
6cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development
Little, Brown and Co., 1973) p. 160

pt

15
exist at all. Does the best hope for the community's members lie in
assimilation, sloughing off peculiar traits and associations for the
sake of joining the larger mainstream? If this is the consensus, it
means creating organizations and tac ti cs to press for an end to
discrimination and ascriptive criteria in public life ... For an
ethnic community it requires a new self-consciousness about what
exactly ethnic distinctiveness entails ..• the argument never ends; it
conti9ues to shape the resources and priorities of communal development.
There exists a certain similarity between Dahl's estimation and
that of Enloe.

For Enloe, emphasis is placed on the community's decision

whether or not to assimilate while Dahl appears to present assimilation
in terms of the greater society's view of the process.

While both views

do illustrate the same process, Enloe adds the dimension of expressed
choice by the community.

Even though Dahl does not deny this aspect of

assimilation, his preoccupation with the societal influence tends to
question the importance of the community's role.
If the type of consciousness that Enloe refers to can be raised,
the effect would stimulate ideologically-oriented questions that machines
are not able to handle.

Ideology does not involve a trade-off; there is

nothing to be sold and nothing to be bartered.

A machine would be

rendered less effective in a situation of this nature.

Again, the

response of the machine would be to stem such activity to prevent confrontation on a level where Jt could not meet its
clear advantage.

11

opposition 11 without a

In this case, efforts would necessarily be placed on

preventing or at least minimizing the opportunity for the opposing groups
to organize.
7cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and.Political Development
(Boston: Little, Bro\'m and Co., 1973) p. 160

16

In view of this application of assimilation to Chicago, it would
seem as if the theory expressed by Knauss and Protess would prove to be
most accurate.

Within the conceptual framework of their theory, gerry-

mandering would become merely a tool for preventing the collective
expression of an ideological demand.

But in addition to this aspect of

gerrymandering is the realization that the effects of its application
would indicate an attempt to quantitatively destroy the vote power of
these ethnic and racial minorities.
The process by which the machine develops and applies the
strategies of gerrymandering will be explained in the next chapter.
The data presented will illustrate that the results of the redrawing of
the ward boundaries served no other distinguishable purpose than the
possible one explained by gerrymandering.

To this end, the principles

of gerrymandering seem to be applied in two ways in Chicago.

First,

there is the attempt to group racial or ethnic communities in certain
areas with the consequence of containing their power by limiting the
possible nurrber of representatives they can elect to the City Council.
Secondly, and primarily in the case of the Spanish-speaking community,
by dispersing the community into as many wards as possible, the machine
is able to keep them from gaining a politically potent majority in any
one ward and thereby keeping them from electing any representation at
all.
From a practical political standpoint, these aspects of gerrymandering in Chicago are identifiable.
identification presents another problem.

However, legally, their
The data that is available
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indicate that neither the national Congress nor the individual state
legislatures has

been able to define and outlaw gerrymandering.8 It has

been largely the function of the courts to determine the legality in a
few specific cases.

But these legislatures have been able to define

"equality of representation" and the courts have assured its political
application in the "one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr.
Reform cities seem more readily able to accept (or perhaps more
precisely, have little choice but to accept) this ruling than is a
machine city like_ Chicago.

In Detroit, electing the councilmen at large

precludes any attempt at gerrymandering, and in Los Angeles, the nature
of the physical city and the scattered instance of racial and ethnic
groupings makes such attempts futile.

The high degree of decentraliza-

tion in New York and the rise of minor parties as well as the splintering
of the Democratic Party have kept the possibility of gerrymandering
nearly nonexistent (although gerrymandering does take place on a national
and state legislative level}.
The essence of the difference between the opportunity for gerrymandering in a machine city and in a reform city is that reform cities
tend to be less centralized (formally and informally).
highly fragmented to effectively gerrymander·.

They are too

Control of the apparatus

for redrawing the ward boundaries is certainly a prerequisite for gerrymandering.

In a h_ighly centralized city (even

control can be achieved with relative ease.

if~

informally), this

It is also necessary to

8Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York:
Random House, 1955) p. 26
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obtain approval for this action (even if only tacit)> approval that can
be realized through the logrolli.ng effects of the patron.age system.
How has Chicago become centralized? To what degree has this
increased the opportunity to gerrymander? The only way to answer these
questions is to examine the political setting in Chicago.

.....

CHAPTER I I I
THE POLITICAL SETTING OF CHICAGO
The state of Illinois has two United States Senators and twentyfour Congressmen.

There are fifty-nine Illinois Legislative Districts,

each with three representatives and one senator.

Illinois is divided
into 102 counties of varying size and population. 1 In the city of
Chicago there are fifty wards 2 with over 3 ,000 preci ncts 3 and seventy-

fi ve community areas.4 There are appointed precinct captains and elected
aldermen and committeemen.

Within this complexity of geo-political and

community divisions lies the structure of a polity.
In a city like Chicago (which has seen a predominance of Democratic "machine style" politics for the last forty-five years, the last
twenty under Mayor Richard J. Daley), the manifestation of representation
is undeniably intertwined with both party and governmental roles.

The

very nature of the machine demands that party officials and representatives work as closely as possible; indeed, sometimes they are indistinlillinois Blue Book, 1973-1974, (Springfield, Illinois:
September, 1974)
2chi cago Muni ci pal Code: Sec ti on 4: 12-64
3source for the number of precincts is the Chicago Board of
Election Commissioners. With the population shifts in the city during
the time of this analysis, the number of precincts was constantly changing. Yet, at no time was it less than 3,000.
4Local Community Fact Book (Chicago Community Inventory, 1950,
1960' 197
19
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guishably close. 5
The political atmosphere in Chicago does not seem to be one of
corruption alone (even in light of the conviction of many top political
leaders), for as Theodore Lowi has pointed out:

11

A 'machine' (member)

might be removed from office, its leaders indicted, but more than likely
the organization suffered very little.

Morale seems higher in defeat

than in victory. u6 The situ ati on may we 11 stern from the dominance
of party politics, even though aldermanic elections are, by law, nonpartisan. 7
In effect, there are two systems existing simultaneously in
Chicago.

One system is that of an established government:

city council.

a mayor and

The other system is political, the Democratic Party.

Before continuing with this analysis, a description of these two systems
is in order.
The formal party structure in Illinois is largely determined by
the Illinois Election Code. 8 The code outlines nominating and election
procedures that limit the scope of any political party.

While this fac-

tor limits the growth of the party influence in certain directions, it
5Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: The
New American Library, 1971) p. 21
6Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold
Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1937) p. v
7chicago Municipal Code: Section 2:1-4
8state of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:2; 8:2 (October
22, 1973)
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does not place parameters on internal party activities.9
In Chicago, the Chairman of the Cook County Central Democratic
Committee is also the Mayor of the city.

This, of course, is not a

provision of law but rather a result of political circumstance. Both
positions have·e><'offitio powers encompassJng a wide scope of influence.
The power vested in the Chairman of the party is transferred through a
network of ward and township committeemen.

It is then passed down

through the precinct captains and finally reaches the party electorate.
The degree of party-menber loyalty (which can be translated into the
vote-getting ability) is rewarded with an appropriate number of perquisites; the rewards may cover the entire spectrum from clearing debris or
repairing a curb all the way to slating a loyal party member for office
or granting a job.
The fifty Democratic Ward Committeemen of the city of Chicago,
together with the committeemen from thirty suburban townships, make up
the Central Committee with Mayor Daley as their party chairman.

The

relationship that exists between the structure of the Party and the city
government is best illustrated by this account that appears in Boss:
Most of them (committeemen) hold an elective office. Many of the
Daley Aldermen are ward bosses. Several are county commissioners.
Others hold office as county clerk, assessor, or recorder of deeds
and a few are congressmen and state legislators. Those who don't
hold office are given top jobs running city departments ••• 10
9state of Illinois Election Laws: Sections 7:8 (October 22,
1973)
lOMike Royko, Boss:· Richard·J~·oaley of Chicago (New York:
New American Library, 1971) p. 70
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At the time of this research, there were fifteen aldermen who were also
ward committeemen {see table on next p_age). Just as the Mayor served as
both party officer and elected official> so too, did these fifteen aldermen.

The positions of alderman and mayor in these cases would appear to

take the duality of party and government and make them as one.

This

action prompted Royko to say of Daley, "He tries to separate political
work from his duties as mayor, but nobody has every been able to see
where one ends and the other begins. u 11
The question has come up often:

Does Mayor Richard J. Daley

possess the slate-making power that many claim he does?

In relation to

this question of the power to decide who runs for what office, when and
how, Mike Royko has this to offer:
••. but even the slate-makers do not kid themselves into thinking
they are deciding who the candidates will be. They listen to the
applicants, push their favorites, the men from their wards, and wait
for Chairman Daley to make up his mind. Some of the men on the
slate-making committee have been surprised to find that they themselves were slated to run for offices they hadn't sought. It is a
one man show and they know it. {Emphasis added.)12
Although the governmental structure in Chicago originally was
designed to be a "weak mayor-strong council" model, the informal reality
of the Mayor's personality and organizational ability seem to have overcome this formal designation.

His personal contacts, energy, old friends

(as well as his ability to make new ones) and his forceful manner aid in
his projection of a strong mayoral position.

Of course, his control over

11 Mike Royko, Boss: Richard·J~ Daley of.Chitago (New York:
New American Library, 1971) p. 21
12 Ibid., p. 81
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INTERSECTION OF ELECTIVE PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL
POSITIONS IN CHICAGO
(Aldermanic Elections - 1971)

Name

Government
···position

Party
Position

Ward

William Barnett

Alderman

Committeeman

2nd

Eugene Sawyer

Alderman

Committeeman

6th

Alexander Adduci

Alderman

Committeeman

9th

Edward Vrdolyak

Alderman

Committeeman

10th

Edward Burke

Alderman

Committeeman

14th

Willi am Shannon

Alderman

Cammi t teeman

17th

Thomas Fitzpatrick

Alderman

Committeeman

19th

Bennett Stewart

Alderman

Committeeman

21st

Vi to Marzullo

Alderman

Committeeman

25th

Thomas Keane

Alderman

Committeeman

31st

Wilson Frost

Alderman

Committeeman

34th

Thomas Casey

Alderman

Committeeman

37th

Anthony Laurino

Alderman

Cammi tteeman

39th

Seymour Simon

Alderman

Cammi tteeman

40th

Roman Pucinski

Alderman

Cammi tteeman

41st

,..
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an estimated 35,000 patronage jobs is very helpful also.13
The formal governmental structure of the city is controlled by
Richard J. Daley in his capacity as mayor.

Together with fifty alder-

men, they form the Chicago City Council (with Daley filling the role as
presiding officer).

Even within this formal designation, there is ample

room for exercising a controlling force.

In the case of the reappor-

tionment of ward boundaries, the function lies within the scope of
legislative duties performed by the City Council.

In spite of the fact

that Daley's formal power is limited to the role of presiding officer,
his control reaches the legislative procedures involved in the act of
reapportionment.
The apportionment function itself comes under the auspices of
the Rules Committee of the City Council.

The Chairman of the Committee

is Alderman Thomas Casey (a regular Democrat who was first elected as
Alderman of the 37th ward in 1965 at a special election held on May 18th;
prior to his election, Casey served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman
for the 37th ward).

Alderman Casey appointed a special subcommittee to

study available data and to make recommendations to the standing committee as to possible new ward boundaries.
The Chairman of this special subcommittee was Alderman Thomas
Keane (31st ward).

The relationship between Keane and Daley is best ex-

plained by this passage by Mike Royko:

"Keane is considered to be second

in Party power .•• It is his (Daley) Council ••• and Keane manages it for
13This estimate was reported in Gosnell 's ·Machine Politics as
that of Alderman Leon Despres as cited by Robert C. Nelson, 11 Machine
Politics Described", in Chtistian SCiQrtce Monitor (July 10, 1961)
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him. 11

This informal arrangement affords Daley the opportunity to wield

tremendous power through the established formal structure.
On November 5th, 1970, Thomas Keane, as Chairman of the special
subcommittee, presented to the entire City Council his map for redistricting the wards in Chicago.

Keane

11

managed 11 forty-one votes in

favor of the ordinance revision while the opposition numbered but six.
The function of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the
political atmosphere of Chicago to lay the groundwork for establishing
the existence of gerrymandering and the role it plays in machine maintenance.

I have already indicated that the apportionment function is

entrusted to the legislative branch of city government and that Mayor
Daley is able to exert a great deal of influence upon those performing
this function.

Mention must be made of Daley's power and the extent to

which he does indeed bring it to bear in legislative actions.
It would appear as if the power that Daley exerts is a product
of his unopposed position in Chicago.

However, despite claims to the

contrary by many of his party cronies, 14 Mayor Daley is not omnipotent.
Edward Banfield asserts that the mayor faces three
him from exercising unlimited power.15

11

checks 11 that prohibit

It is Banfield's contention that

the three checks are placed by other elected officials, the court system
and the electorate themselves.

If Banfield's contentions are correct,

14Mi ke Roy ko ~ .:;.Bo;;;s;,.:;;s;...;.:~R:,.:.;i~c:..;.:h.=:.ar.:_d::. .....:...J...:....-,..;D'-=a;-.;l...:...e"'"'=-'---.----,,-;"i-.
New American Library, 1971
See especial y
discussion of this point.)
15Edward c. Banfield; Political Influence (New York:
Press, 1961) pp. 238-239
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then Daley would have only limited power in the City Council.
The first check that Banfield refers to would appear to be based
on the premise that effective government necessitates counterbalancing
measures between the different levels and branches:
would be hard pressed to find any fault with.

a premise that I

This "balancing" that he

finds "essential" can be achieved through different methods.

There is

that based on partisan or ideological grounds; that based on the concept
of the "common good" regardless of the official's personal affiliation;
and there is a balance borne of pressure and discipline.

Banfield ad-

mits that this first check is usually performed by a member of the
opposite party.

But this end is not always so easily accomplished in

Chicago in view of the fact that there seldom exists an elected official
of the opposite political party. 16
With the slate-making ability that Daley possesses and Banfield's
own admission of Chicago's home rule provisions in the Illinois Constitution17 and the absence of any real party opposition, there would seem
to be few elected officials to perform this first check.

When an

official does attempt to check Daley's power he finds himself faced with

16with the noted exception on the local level of Bernard Carey
as Cook County States Attorney, there are few local officials elected
in Chicago from the Republican Party. However, independent Democrats
and other Democratic Party 11 i rregul ars 11 may also perform the function
that Banfield refers to.
17Illinois State Constitution, Article VII; Section 6
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serious. primary and general election battles.18
11

The principle of the separation of powers, which assures the

court's independence .. _19 is the basis for the second check described by
Banfield.

A confrontation between the machine and the court would

probably produce a civic controversy that may weaken the electorate's
view of the machine.
often take

11

But Banfield continues by admitting that judges

cues 11 from political leaders in deciding cases (except in

civil matters).20 He counters this admission by adding that one sure
way to avoid political influence is to take the case to the Supreme
Court.

However, this action takes time, money and organization.

Since

forces opposing the machine have been hard pressed to organize viable
campaigns in both city and county elections, the probability of organizing an effort that would reach the Supreme Court is highly limited (the
present case of gerrymandering excepted).

Furthermore, not only is

Mayor Daley the personal friend of many of the judges, but the absence
of merit selection has allowed the Mayor again to exercise his slatemaking power in slating perspective candidates for the bench in Chicago.
18A classic example of Daley's ability to co-opt his opposition
may well be the case of Benjamin Adamowski. In 1963, Adamowski was the
Republican candidate for mayor running against Richard J. Daley.
Adamowski was engaged in a bitter conflict with Daley and on several
occasions claimed that Daley misused the police to spy on Adamowski.
Daley narrowly won the election over Adamowski ts formidable challenge.
For the election in· 1975, Benjamin S. Adamowski publically endorsed
Richard J. Daley in his re-election campaign against Independent Democratic Alderman William Singer.
19Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York:
Press, 1961) p. 239
2orb; d., p. 239
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In relation to the third check coming from the electorate,
Banfield proposes that the electorate's potential to vote the machine
out of office constitutes a force for compromise which, in turn, could
compel the Mayor to respond to the interests of the electorate or face
possible defeat in a primary or general election.

With corruption in

city government, loss of tax base, deteriorating schools and selective
dispersal of services facing them,the electorate in Chicago still refrained from changing this potential into a reality in the primary and
general election that provided Richard J. Daley with an unprecedented
sixth term as mayor.
These checks do exist; it is undeniable.

Their effectiveness in

view of the re-election of Mayor Daley and his aldermen remains questionable.

There seem to be but two alternative answers in light of these

election results.

Either the electorate is satisfied with city govern-

ment as it is (the Mayor has responded to their interests), or there exists
another force that prohibits the exercise of this potential.

It is

entirely possible to establish the existence of such a force that would
mitigate the opportunity to express the potential to vote out the
machine without answering the question of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the Chicago electorate.

There are several conditions that

may cause the electorate to refrain from exercising this potential even if
they were dissatisfied.
One condition that could cause reluctance to exercise the right
of recall may well involve the Mayor's influence in the formal structure
of the city's government.

Control of the different agencies and levels
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of the executive branch enables the Mayor to exert his influence on the
lives of a great number of people connected with these different agencies.
This passage from Banfield (when coupled with the knowledge of the
Mayor's ever present slate-making power) aptly describes the depth of
his influence:
The executive, however, is not a single body. It is several. The
mayor is one. The city treasurer and city clerk, both elected and
therefore no more responsible to the mayor than he to them, are
others. Schools are run by a board appointed by the mayor but not
removable by him. Public housing is run by another such board, the
transit authority by another, parks by still another •.. 21
The combination of party chairman and mayor tends to overcome the formal
decentralization that this explanation of the executive branch of
go's government indicates.

Chica~

The influence that can be exerted on the

lives of all individuals associated with these facets of the government
(not to mention those individuals who can be reached by other party members) may account for some of the conditions that prevent a specific
portion of the city from exercising the potential Banfield referred to.
There are other points at which the formal separation of party
position and nonpartisan official seem to disappear.

This in itself

also may keep certain members of the electorate from initiating any
potential check on the Mayor.

Besides the half-dozen self-proclaimed

independents, there is only one person on the current city council who
claims to be anything but a Democrat, Alderman Dennis Block (48th ward}.
Opposition to the Regular Democratic Party leadership in the
21 Edward C. Banfield~ Political Influence (New York:
Press, 1961} p. 236
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Chicago City Council rarely, if ever, exceeded ten votes. 22 The estimated average of opposition is closer to two votes. This study of the
opposition illustrates more closely the connection between the structure
of the Democratic Party and the nature of government in Chicago.
The reasons for explaining the relationship between the Democratic Party and Chicagols city government is to illustrate that the
unification of these two separate entities has created an atmosphere
one can safely assume that the interests of one of these two entities is
undoubtedly the interest of the other.
Based on this awareness of the mutual interests of the Party and
the elected officials in Chicago, there are grounds to impute possible
reasons for certain political actions.

If the role of the City Council

as redistricter was indeed biased by the influence of the Democratic
Party, then the need for continued gerrymandering as a result of this
bias should be examined.

However, before entertaining any notions of

bias and collusion, the concept of gerrymandering should be placed in a
national as well as local perspective to gain some insight into its
possible political repercussions.

22An unpublished study by Ole Bjarrum of Loyola University in
Chicago of 250 randomly selected ordinances in 1967 and 1973 indicated
that 205 of the 250 received no opposition at all. In those instances
where opposition was recorded, the average number of votes in opposition to machine policy was 3.75. There were only three occasions where
the vote in opposition exceeded 10.
23Theodore J. Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition" in Harold
Gosnell~ Machine Politics:· Chicago·Model (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1937} p. x
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
••. ingenious techniques for capitalizing upon ethnic and racial
heterogeneity have been invented in city after city ..• The machines
(which employed them) were based upon a congeries of people with
uncommon ends, held together at the center by logrolling and at
the periphery by fraternite, egalite and ignorance .••
One of the "ingenious techniques" that machines have employed is gerrymandering.

It has invaded all levels of government in the United

States and owes its allegiance to neither Democrat nor Republican, to
no particular region of the country, level of economy or extent of
education.
While it is the expressed intention of this study to examine
gerrymandering in Chicago, a proper perspective from which to judge the
consequences of this action must be porvided.

To develop the basis for

this perspective, I have chosen to examine historical aspects of the use
of gerrymandering on national and state levels and then proceed to its
specific application in Chicago, highlighting both similarities and
differences among the levels.
Prior to the 11 one man, one vote" ruling of Baker v Carr, there
were seven states (New Jersey, Idaho, South Carolina, Montana, Arizona,
New Mexico and Nevada) that, regardless of population size, allowed each
!Theodore Lowi, "Forward to the Second Edition, Harold Gosnell,
Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
11

1937) p. v
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county the same nunt>er of representatives in the state senate. 2 (This
does not include those states that followed the same formula for their
lower house or for both houses.)

As Karl Bosworth has pointed out,

under a system that permits inequality of representation

11

•••

any

lsovereigntyt of counties or towns is based on entrenched political
power, not on constitutional or democratic theory. 11 3 If Bosworth's
estimation is correct, then a system existing with these inequities
illustrates a model where the states involved are unitary and not
federal in their makeup.

With inherent inequities in the system that

result from variations in size and population such as these do, the use
of gerrymandering to the advantage of any particular political party
becomes an elementary maneuver.
The extent to which

11

•••

a ci vi 1 di vision can be drawn to present

an unfair advantage to a given political party" may best be noted by the
example of the New Jersey legislature.

In 1960,

11

•••

rural Sussex

Countyts 49,255 inhabitants and metropolitan Essex County's 923,545 each
sent one senator to the New Jersey Legislature. 11 4 Similar inequities
were noted in 1963 and in 1965 in Washington, Oregon, South Dakota,
Minnesota, Virginia and Indiana (as well as in the seven previously mentioned states).

But each of these examples and the countless others

2Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution {New York:
Random House, 1955) p. 25
3Kar1 A. Bosworth, "Law Making in State Governments," The· FortyEi ht States, Their.Tasks ·as ·Polic ·Makers and Administrators {New York:
ia n1vers1ty ress, 1
p.
4Baker, op. cit., p. 25
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noted by Baker, Bosworth, Hacker et· aL i 11 ustrate a representation
borne of unequal size and not of the type that occurred in Chicago.
The undemocratic principles at work in reapportionment that fail
to reflect the true population of a given civil division are more readily
corrected than those realized through gerrymandering for partisan, ethnic
or racial reasons.

It is true that gerrymandering of the New Jersey

type denies equality of representations but it does not single out a
specific portion of the population (identifiable by race, political
affiliation, or ethnic background).

In fact, this former type of reap-

portionment develops usually for one of two reasons:

constitutionally

inadequate provisions that limit the ability to correct these inequities
or legislative failure to redistrict in accordance with population shifts,
even when such constitutional provisions were available.
These two prevailing reasons for the inequality of districts are
based on the realization that like Sussex and Essex Counties in New
Jersey, the difference was a product of population size.

An equally as

corrnnon practice is the effects of reapportionment that collect or exclude certain sections of a given area in terms of past voting records.
A cursory examination of some of the

11

cartographi cal surgery 115 that took

pl ace in New York wi 11 demonstrate this type of gerrymanderi_ng.
In both 1951 and 1961 the Republican legislature. in New York
found it quite elementary to gerrymander Congress ion al Districts {without
seriously affecting population totals for the districts).
SGordon E. Baker~·rhe·Rea
Random Houses 1955) p. 82
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old 12th District (nm·1 the 15th) wound its way through the streets of
Brooklyn gathering small pockets of Republicans.

For four straight

elections, the Republicans succeeded in electing one of their own to
Congress from this district.

In 1960, the election was lost to a Demo-

crat.

In 1961, the Republican legislature created the 15th District
(in Brooklyn), returning it to their list of 11 safe 11 GOP districts. 6 The

resulting map, a product of the Republican legislature's attempt to
return lost Republican seats, resembled the map that Governor Gerry first
produced in 1812.
In an article in the New Republic, Robert Dietsch has quoted
Congressman Emanuel Celler (Dem., New York) as saying that the New York
Congressional Districts resemble 11 .•. wash hanging on a line, quaint
abstract painting and East and West·Pakistan. 11

In the same article
Dietsch relates Tylor and Wells' estimation by citing 11 •.. the Districts

appear as the Jaws of the Wrench, The Upside Down Crocodile, The Camel
Biting the Tail of the Buffalo
Dachshund. 117

~Jhich

is Stepping on the Tail of the

These descriptions are only slightly exaggerated for effect.
Splitting blocks, retracing steps, and apparently abandoning all logic
are characteristics of this type of apportionment.

But the loss of logic

is only visible to those who do not bother to examine the case further.
6Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York:
Random House, 1955) p. 83
7Robert W. Dietsch, "The 1971 Gerrymander 11 in The New Republic
(May 29, 1971) p. 21
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The 1961 map of New York s legislative districts illustrates the depth
1

of influence of gerrymandering by what appears to be a totally illogical
creation of a district.

The 16th legislative district, comprised in part

by the northern section of Staten Island, is continued six to e_ight miles
away in the center of Brooklyn.a This maneuver is "f>C>lititally l_ogical
because voting patterns indicate that both areas are highly Republican.
In the case of New York and California in 1961, and the other
states previously mentioned, this type of gerrymandering is best
achieved under certain limited conditions.

The operationalizing of

gerrymandering is facilitated when one party clearly dominates both
houses of the legislature (and therefore controls the machinery for redistricting) and when that party holds the position of chief executive
in the state.

When a party dominates the legislature, it becomes much

easier to rearrange districts to facilitate the re-election of party
members (especially when there is no fear of reprisal from the opposition or little chance of a veto from the governor).

From the two

definitions we have arrived at (machine and gerrymandering), one is
faced with the consideration that those conditions that facilitate gerrymander are approximately the same conditions that describe the existence
of a machine.

This is not to say that .Q.!!..!y_ a legislature with one party

with a clear majority or a machine controlled polity is able to gerrymander, but rather that these particular conditions facilitate it.

In

the previous chapter, I re 1ated how dominance of the Chi c_ago City Coun8-rhis evaluation is based on the New York Congressional District
Map as it appeared in the.Congressional Quarterly (4-10-71)
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cil by Mayor Daley and the Democratic Party facilitated the opportunity
for ge rryman de ring.
In the following chapters, I will explain how that opportunity
became a reality.

What of the actual mechanics of implementing such a

technique as gerrymandering?

Chicago, the archetype of the "old

politics,. 11 usually manages to come up with the latest methods and the
most advanced technology for aiding its political leaders in their bids
for re-election.
sion, however.

Chicago will have to take a back seat on this occaWhile a few members of the Chicago City Council redrew

ward boundaries, Robert Dietsch, in an article in the Saturday Review,
was revealing how the Hoosiers tech11ol ogi cally surpassed the efforts of
Mayor Daley and Company.

The article states:

The baroque possibilities of gerrymander-by-computer are illustrated in Indiana, where the fifth Congressional District has been
cybemetically carved out to be ultra-safe for Republican Representative Elwood H. Hillis. The district was made to run from just
south of the Michigan line through at least half of the Hoosier
state to Indianapolis. The gerrymanders did throw into Hillis'
district a portion of Washington Township (outside of Indianapolis)
that is turning Black and that normally votes Democratic. In a complex bit of mathematics that was aided by the computer, the gerrymanderers figured that Hillis could lose those 4,000 Black votes and
still remain safe, and that the votes meanwhile would be taken away
from Democrat Andrew Jacobs, Jr., in an adjoining district. For
Jacobs' own district the GOP computer worked out some very fancy
geometry. The district used to be 11 L11 shaped and had only eight
comers--a relatively compact and contiguous district. But today,
after the work ~f the Indiana gerrymanderers and the computers,
Jacob's district has at least twenty-four corners, and its western
boundary jigs and jags like a salamander scurrying over hot rocks.9
The political cartoon on the following page perhaps best illustrates the relationship that has developed between the political
9Robert W. Dietsch, 11 The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's
Gambit, Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972): 42-47
11

11
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and the technological age.10 It may well suggest that the 11 boss 11 has
not died off, but rather has become computerized; a nameless figure, a
product of our need for progress.
Recounting the story of the Indiana 5th Congressional District
demonstrates the degree to which gerrymandering has become a part of
our political culture.

It would not seem out of the scope of this

analysis to envision an entire profession growing up around the desire
for more precise gerrymandering.

One must not only examine population

statistics, but growth charts, numbers of registered voters and partisan
strength are all now fundamental to a successful gerrymander like that
of the Indiana 5th Congressional District.

With the computers enormous

capacity to store, categorize and recall information, the results can
now be more exact and equally as devastating.

A~

any programmer can

tell you, a computer is only as neutral as those who program it. While
they were originally used to aid in the complex calculations necessary
to comply with the Court's ruling concerning the population of legisla· tive district, computers now are used to consider those factors they
were i ni ti ally designed to ignore.
While Indiana may have affected the first noted use of technology, Chicago has used gerrymandering (in its more traditional form} for
quite some time.

In fact, Gosnell recounts this episode in Chicago's

history:
In drawing ward lines all the tricks of gerrymandering are also employed by the aldermen ••• the extent to which nationality and racial
lORobert W. Dietsch, "The Remarkable Resurgence of Gerry's
Gambit,'' Saturday Review, (June 3, 1972) p. 43
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groups were cut into small bits by the 1921 and 1931 ward lines ...
Ward committeemen of Irish extraction have been particularly active
in splitting up their bailiwicks so as to prevent their defeat by
Italian> Polish or Jewish rivals.11
It would appear that in the 160 years since Elbridge Gerry, all that has
been learned is how to apply more complex techniques to an already complex method.
Just as time has not changed the effects of gerrymandering on
the political scene, it would appear that time is unable to change even
the scene itself in Chicago.

Harold Gosnell has said

11

•••

the political

power structure of the city of Chicago has probably changed the least
during the decades following 1937 ..... 12

From an historical perspective,

one can witness the eventual demise of all other big city machines;13
yet, Chicago still is run by a Democratic machine organization.
In this era that Gosnell refers to, there has always been a
close relationship between the mayor of Chicago and the Cook County Central Democratic Committee.

Through patronage and the control of party

nominations, along with the informal relationship created between county
agencies, the political

11

bosses 11 of this era have developed a well-

functioning machine.14
llHarold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics:· Chicago Model (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1937) pp. 30-31
12rbi d., p. 221
berg~

13For more in depth anal~sis and explanation see Alfred Stein·The Bosses (New York: Md1lllan, 1972}
14Gosnell, op. cit., p. 223

40

Democratic party chairman in the early period, Patrick A. Nash,
11

wa lked hand-in-gl ave with Mayor Kelley • 11 15 There was no question as to

the significance of the Kelley-Nash machine.
In the middle period, the election of Martin Kennelley as a
reformer was engineered by Party Chairman Colonel Jacob Arvey to justify
party maintenance.

He felt it was necessary to "suffer through 11 the

interim with a reformer rather than face possible defeat.

While

Kennelley was not part of the machine-producing group, the political
boss of the period (Arvey) staged Kennelley's election, a task that only
a powerful man could have accomplished.
When Richard J. Daley decided to run for mayor after his election as Party Chairman in 1953, he was denied Arvey's support but still
went on to win the primary over incumbent Mayor Kennelley in 1955. 16 It
was a major step forward in machine politics in Chicago to try and combine the two positions of mayor and party chairman in one individual.
It would take a great deal of political expertise to accomplish such a
bold maneuver.
In the mayoral election of that year, Daley defeated Robert E.
Merriam with his

11

greatest support coming from the Black Belt and from

the west side wards where the machine was strongest. 11 17 The role of the
black wards in this first Daley victory is important to the consideration
l5Harold F. Gosnell~ Machine Politics:· ·chicago Model (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 223

16Ibid., pp. 226-227
17rbid., p. 221
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at hand.

It was the black area that put Daley in power, and it would

be demonstrated later that continued support by the black community
would be essential to his re-election.
Daley won over Sheehan in 1959 with big support again coming
from the black areas (although with 71.4% of the vote marked for Daley,
it was not to prove to be a test of his strength in the black areas).
But in 1963, Daley faced his most formidable challenger since Merrian
(and in terms of election results, his most formidable challenger to
date).

Daley won the election over Benjamin Adamowski with a vote mar-

gin of 55.7% to 44.3% •.

An analysis of the election results establishes

that Adamowski received 51% of the votes cast in all white areas while
Daley won an

11

enormous black vote. 11 18

election outcome:

There could be no doubt about the

without the black areas Daley would have had much

greater difficulty in winning that election.
In the fo 11 owing chapters, i ndi vi dual wards with large numbers
of minorities will be examined to illustrate the link between the need
for the support of the black areas and the use of gerrymandering in
achieving some control over these areas.

The analysis is divided into

two chapters to correspond to the two major methods of achieving control;
i.e., "dispersal 11 and "confinement. 11

In terms of the confinement strate-

gy, the 7th, 14th and 19th wards will be examined; the dispersal strategy
will be examined through an analysis of gerrymandering in the 31st ward .
. 18r~ike Royko, Boss:· ·Richard J~ Daley·of Chicago (New York:
New Arrerican Library, 1971)

The

CHAPTER V
GERRYMANDERING IN CHICAGO:
AN OVERVIEW
The complaint has been made that the entire city of Chicago has
been gerrymandered in the reapportionment of its wards in 1971. 1 The
contention involves the concept of 11 key 11 wards which allegedly were
altered to allow regular· Democrats to obtain or to strengthen their hold
in certain areas of the city.

The result of such a situation would be

that the 'surrounding wards would suffer from this remappi ng2 and therefore would be
11

11

inadvertantly gerrymandered; 11 if a sufficient number of

key 11 wards existed, the city as a whole (all fifty wards) would also

certainly be affected by the reapportionment.
lThe entire city gerrymander \.'tas outlined in the brief filed by
William Cousins in the case of Cousins v City Council, 73-1891; 73-2127,
7th Cir. (1971). In this brief filed with the District Court in Chicago,
Cousins, as attorney for the plaintiffs, contended that more than just
the blatantly gerrymandered wards were at stake.
2The logical conclusions, as the theory was presented by Cousins~
is that when a particular ward is gerrymandered to afford one party or
individual a certain electoral advantage, those civil divisions immediately contiguous to the ward in question would undoubtedly suffer a
comparable miscarriage of justice. To draw the argument to its fullest,
presumably, if one ward was gerrymandered it could affect every other
ward in the city in what may be called a "ripple effect. 11 It is my
understanding that Cousins did not intend for this to be the conclusion
we were to draw from his theory, but rather that there were indeed a
series of smaller "ripple effects" simultaneously affecting the city.
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What I propose to do in this chapter is establish an overview
of four wards in the city that I consider

11

key 11 wards. 3 By examining

the 7th, 14th, 19th and 31st wards I would hope to present a. general
picture of the nature of gerrymandering in the city.

In the following

chapter, the 31st ward will be examined in greater detail with the express intention of explicating the problem and its ramifications in
terms of social consequence.
Inasmuch as there is obvious di ffi cul ty (and questionable value)
in examining all fifty wards, these particular wards were chosen to
highlight the type of situation encountered as well as to present concrete examples of the relationship between the Democratic Party and the
act of gerrymandering in Chicago.
The rationale for lllY choice of wards involves both political and
legal aspects as well as the socio-economic elements of the communities
involved.

In terms of the legal consideration, in the case brought to

trial4 three of the four wards were named among those alleged to be most
flagrantly gerrymandered (all but the 19th).

All four wards were experi-

encing a racial change in the nature of their electorates.
wards were

11

All four

machine dominated" wards controlled by machine aldermen in

tandem with the Democratic Ward Committeeman (who, in three of the four
cases, was the same man,. the 7th ward bei_ng the exception).

3MY choice of the term key wards is designed to coincide with
the theory as introduced by Cousins but in a more limited sense as the
remainder of the text will bear out.
·4coosins v·city-Countil of.Chitago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th cir.
( 1971)

jP
44

While they shared these elements in common, there are elements
in each ward that make the individual ward particularly important to a
study of this nature.
J. Bohling.

In 1971, the Alderman of the 7th ward was Nichol as

Within two months of his election he was appointed to fill a

vacancy on the Bench in Chicago which in turn forced a vacancy in his
aldermanic seat.

The special election that followed entertained a field

of sixteen candidates; an election that resulted in a run-off between Rev.
Richard Lawrence (the Independent Voters of Illinois endorsed candidate
and former member of the Woodlawn Organization) and Robert Wilinski (a
community activist with local youth groups and restaurant and bar manager).

After Wilinski won the electionlll Rev. Lawrence joined several

others in filing suit to claim gerrymandering in Chicago in the hopes of
gaining relief in terms of the 7th ward.

In 1973, the Federal Court of

Appeals ordered the 7th ward redrawn and another election held.

At this

time, Wilinski declined to seek the office and Gerald Jones (former city
college administrator, and presently a sociology teacher) won the election.

Subsequent to this action, a federal three-judge Appeals Panel

ordered the 7th ward returned to its origin al boundaries and denied
Wilinski the aldermanic seat, leaving Jones as the alderman.5

In the

1975 aldermanic elections, Robert Wilinski, the Regular Democratic
5The court's decision to return the 7th ward to its original
boundaries came after the major portion of the research for this paper
had been finished. Nonetheless, the outcome of the decision has little
or no bearing on the study insofar as the order to redraw the ward
boundaries does not prove that gerrymandering didn't take place just as
the initial order to redraw did not prove that gerrymandering did take
place.
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candidate, defeated Gerald Jones in yet another run-off election and
now serves as the alderman of the 7th ward.
Before, during and after this political battle, the 7th ward
was experiencing a racial changeover.

Just prior to and after the

election the area became largely black and Latino.

The ward is ideal

for this type of study .. -racially changing, politically turbulent with
Democrat battling Independent--and as such lends itself to gerrymandering.
The 14th ward is a blue collar, middle class neighborhood
experiencing a somewhat similar and yet unique change.

The alderman

before the alleged gerrymandering as well as after it was Edward M.
Burke.

The 14th ward has been a "machine dominated" ward at least since

1953 when Joseph P. Burke, the father of the current alderman, won in a
special election.

When Joseph Burke died in December of 1968, his son

was slated by the machine to run in the special election of March 14,
1969.

Edward Burke won re-election in both 1971 and 1975. With the

influx of blacks into the 14th ward in the late sixties and carrying over
into the seventies, the ward was undergoing a change that might have
created a contest for Burke possibly resulting in the election of a
black a1derman.
While the 14th ward was a blue collar neighborhood, the 19th ward
was a predominantly Irish Catholic, upper-middle class area whose boundaries appeared to move westward with each reapportionment.

It, like the

two previous wards, was "machine dominated" at the time of the 1971 reapportionment.

For four consecutive terms, Alderman Thomas Fitzpatrick
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(who also served as the Democratic Ward Committeeman) represented the
19th ward in the City Council.

Fitzpatrick became an influential Demo-

crat through his role on the Zoning Board and Plan Commission (Fitzpatrick
was Chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Zoning). Again, this ward,
like the two previous wards, was experiencing a racial change that may
have caused competition for the aldermanic seat.
The 31st ward is also "machine dominated:" it had been 11 run 11 for
thirty years by the same man--Thomas Keane, until his conviction for mail
fraud and conspiracy in 1973.
electorate.

It too was undergoing a change in the

But the change in the 31st ward is unlike the other wards

in that the change is not from white to black, but from white to
Spanish-speaking.

There are other elements that make the 31st ward an

important choice:

the alderman from the 31st ward was in charge of the

reapportionment itself.

A study of this ward highlights the two major

approaches employed by the machine to gerrymander (i.e., "dispersal" and
"confinement").
All four wards were "machine dominated prior to the alleged
11

gerrymandering.

They then underwent a demographic change in the elector-

ate that could have precipitated a challenge to the machine for the
aldermanic seats.

Finally, after the reapportionment of the ward bound-

aries, these wards were returned to their original social makeup and
"machine dominance" continued.
A statistical analysis of each of these wards will demonstrate
how this change was accomplished.

While it is perhaps easy to place

greater emphasis on either the pros or cons of a given argument with the
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use of statistics, in a more comprehensive sense they tend to speak for
themselves.

The chart on the following page lists the population shifts

for the four wards being analyzed.

The change is based on census

figures for the last twenty years and in the case of all wards except
the 31st includes a three per cent conversion factor.

This factor was

added to the population figures in the 1970 census on1y·after the new
ward boundaries were considered.

It is a methodological inclusion that

results from various claims of census inaccuracies that have been
reported since 1970.6 The three per cent figure is somewhat arbitrary
in that it is designed to meet a compromise between the two major claims
concerning the inaccuracies.

The United States Census Bureau has ad-

mitted to a possible two per cent undercount because of inaccurate
reporting methods, while urbanologist Pierre de Vise claims that
Chicago's population has been undercounted by over 138,000 people (about
four per cent) J
figures.

Both claims of inaccuracy are based on the 1970 census

The 31st ward, hat1ever, does not include this factor because

of an updated population count of the Spanish-speaking (based on ward
boundaries} that was released by the City of Chicago Department of
Development and Planning.8
6The account of de Vise's claims of census inaccuracy were reported by Dennis Byrne in the Chicago Daily News, Tuesday, March 26,
1974.

7rbid.
8The report released by the Department of Development and Planning for the City of Chicago can be obtained from their Office of
Jnformati on.
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POPULATION CHANGES AS NOTED BY CENSUS DATA

Ward

Community Area
South Shore
South Chicago

7th
7th

1960
Population
Count*

1970
Population
Count**

7 ,018
2,488

55,483
10 ,208

9,506

65,791

------- ------ - - - 14th
14th
14th
14th

11,692
166
1,368
13,600

Fuller Park
New City
West Englewood
Englewood

-19th
19th
19th
19th
19th

---- --

26 ,826

-

Auburn-Gresham
Beverly
Washington Hts.
Mt. Greenwood
Morgan Park

15
14
1,848
4
4,498
6 ,799

- --- - - - ---- ---- - 31st
31st

Humboldt Park
West Town

---

-----

- - -

7 ,860
20 ,935
28, 795

- - -- - - - -- -

--

Total After
Reapportionment:
1971***

29,563

- - - - - ------

7' 168
2' 126
4,000
17,000

-

30 ,294

6 ,760

-- --- - -- --

-

7,878
0
10 ,641
88
7 ,401
26,008

---------

7,714

11, 122
48,900
60,022

22,159

------ ------

*

The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1960
for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the
Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward.

**

The figures in this column indicate the U.S. Census totals for 1970
for the black population in the 7th, 14th, and 19th wards and the
Spanish-speaking in the 31st ward.

***

The totals in this column represent the black or Spanish-speaking
totals for the individual wards after the 1971 reapportionment in
Chicago.
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As of 1960, on the South Side of Chicago along the lakefront,
the 7th ward was primarily comprised of two community areas:

South

Shore and South Chicago. According to the United States Census figures,
South Shore contained 7,018 blacks. 9 Immediately south of this area is
the community designated as South Chicago; in 1960, there were 2,488
blacks.
9,000.

This brought the total black population of the ward to over
In the same two communities in 1960, the white population

totaled 113,493; a ratio of greater than ten to one.
If the ward boundaries of the 7th ward and all of the immediately surrounding wards had not been changed after the 1970 census, the
black population of this area would have totaled 65,791.

The white

population of the same area under the same conditions would have totaled
60,493.

The ratio of black to white had changed from ten to one in

favor of the white population to a five thousand-plus black majority.
However, with the eventual change in the ward boundaries, the
newly constructed 7th ward, including the conversion factor of three per
cent, contains a black population of 29,563.
11

excluded 11 from the 11 new 11 ward.

Over 30,000 blacks were

Where did they go? Certainly, it is

evident that moving the ward did not involve the actual displacement of
families, but the possible political reasons for this action would tend
to leave the question open for further discussion.

The largest portion

of the 30,000 blacks (approximately 60%) were included in the redrawi_ng
9All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the
populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagwa and P.
M. Hauser~·tocal Corilmunity·Fatt Book (Chicago: Chicago Community
Inventory, 1950, 1960), unless otherwise noted.
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of the 5th ward.

The 5th ward is

11

traditionally independent (twenty
11

years of service by anti-machine Alderman Leon Despres).

If one consid-

ers the election outcome in the pre-gerrymandered 5th ward a foregone
con cl usi on in terms of the uncha llengabil i ty of Alderman Despres, then
the possible reason for the increased black population in the ward could
be an attempt by the machine to obfuscate any future hopes Despres (a
white) might have.
The results of the ward boundary change are evident.
population of the 7th ward after the change was 37,569.

The white

There were now

8,000 more whites in the ward, as opposed to the 5,000 black majority
before the ward boundaries were changed.

The opportunity for the machine

to control the election was increased with the presence of a clear
majority of whites; for slate-making reasons, it is certainly easier to
appeal to one ethnic or racial group than it is to appeal to two distinct
groups in the same ward.

The outcome of the elections that resulted

from the change bears out this analysis; when the court ordered the ward
remapped (and as it turns out, in favor of a majority of blacks) a black,
Gerald Jones,won the election.

When the federal Appeals Panel of judges

returned the ward to its origin a1 gerrymandered boundaries (with the
11

11

8,000 white majority) a white, Robert Wilinski, won the election.
Why not create a new black ward and 11 allow 11 the residents to
elect a machine candidate? At present the machine is
with the fifteen black wards already in existence.

deali~g

quite well

One can only theorize

as to why they hope to limit the number of black wards.

However, taking

into account the possibility that these fifteen aldermen have a racial
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heri t_age in common and that this heritage may be strong enough to cause
them to vote along racial or ideol_ogical lines, the machine might fear
the outcome of this unification in relation to possible opposition to
machine policy.

It is true that fifteen is not sufficient to cause

great turmoil; yet, with the inclusion of the half-dozen independents
and one Repub 1i can in the City Council, sheer numbers are enough to
cause party regulars some concern about adding additional all-black
wards.
By using gerrymandering to control the number of wards where
blacks could possibly elect their own representatives, the machine is
able to limit the extent to which this potential unification can approach
a reality.

Through this process of containment (which is necessary be•

cause of the large population of blacks in the city as opposed to the
Spanish-speaking), the machine is able to establish a limited number of
all black wards and divide the remaining blacks up in such a manner as
to keep them from gaining a political advantage in any other wards.
The 7th ward is not the only example of the use of this containrrent policy.

Located approximately in the geographic center of the city

is the geopolitical distinction referred to by municipal code as the 14th
ward.

This ward is comprised (either wholly or in part) of the community

areas known as Fuller Park, New City, West Englewood and Englewood.lo
10While the population figures for each community area are close
to being accurate, the transformation from community figures to ward
figure·s tend to distort the actual picture to some degree. However, the
overall effect is minimized by us_ing the same formula in all cases and
adding the conversion factor.
·
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The combined black population for these four community areas (in proportion to the percentage they contribute to the total makeup of the
ward) was 26,826 in 1960.

The white population for the same period was

30,383; a white majority of som:? 4,000 persons existed at the time of
the 1960 census.

Had the ward boundaries remained the same after the

1970 census, the black population of the 14th ward would have totaled
30 ,294.

The increase of less than 4,000 blacks in less than ten years

is not as large an increase as many of the other wards in the city experienced in the same time span.

But this increase, coupled with the

decrease in the white population from 30,833 to 18,991, would have
given blacks a clear majority in the ward.

Obviously, the loss of in-

habitants in the ward necessitated a change in the ward boundaries.
The 14th ward contained nearly 27,000 blacks in 1960 and over
30,000 in 1970; one would expect that if the pattern of gerrymandering
used in the 7th ward was applied to the 14th ward, the results would
indicate a probable loss of one-half of its black population.

After re-

drawing the ward boundaries, however, the black population (including
the conversion factor of three per cent) was 6,760.
were drawn out of the "new" ward.

Nearly 25,000 blacks

The 7th ward lost approximately 55%

of its black population while the 14th lost almost 76%.
As indicated by the increase in the black population of both the
3rd and 11th wards, the blacks excluded from the 14th were drawn into
these wards.

The 3rd ward was redrawn to include approximately 16,000 of

those excluded (with the 11th receiving the remaining amount).

The

eastern edge of the 14th ward (a totally black area) was remapped into
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the 3rd ward (which in turn allowed the reapportioners to move the 14th
ward farther west into all white" areas).
11

The 3rd ward was

for the machine by United States Congressman Ralph Metcalfe.

11

controlled

11

(Metcalfe,

former alderman and current Democratic Ward Committeeman for the 3rd
ward had previously demonstrated his loyalty to the machine but began a
major break as a result of his position on community control of the
police and his endorsement of William S. Singer for the Democratic candidate for Mayor.

The complete break did not materialize until after the

1971 redrawing, however.) With the 3rd ward being both a black and a
machine ward, the influx of additional blacks would not affect the future
election outcomes.
In the case of the 11th ward where the remaining 9,000 or so
blacks were moved to, the Alderman, Michael Bilandic, is unquestionably a
machine alderman.

In Daley's own ward, there is always a concerted ef-

fort to produce the best turnout and the greatest number of Democratic
votes in the 11th ward.

The black population of the 11th ward after this

move was no more than twenty per cent--a percentage that sti 11 allowed
for an overwhelming control by machine captains even in the event that
blacks decided to vote against a machine candidate.

The area that was

incorporated into the 11th ward was already a black neighborhood (along
the frontage of the Dan Ryan Expressway).

This maneuver permitted the

reapportioners to move the 14th ward two blocks farther south (as well as
farther west with the aid of the 3rd ward maneuver).

The resulting

white majority in the 14th ward (over 36,000) would have been more than
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enough to elect a white Daley alderman, thereby limiting the number of
black wards and still keeping the machi.ne in power in that area.

(They

did elect Alderman Edward M. Burke, who also served as the Democratic
Ward Committeeman).
The maps on the following pages indicate the position of the
14th ward (as well as the other three wards being examined) in both
1960 and 1970.

The third map in the group is an overlay of both years

and graphically portrays the changes in ward boundaries.
Another ward that fits somewhat into the pattern already established in terms of gerrymandering in Chicago is the 19th ward.

Situated

in the southwestern most comer of the city, the 19th ward in 1960
included all or part of Auburn-Gresham, Beverly, Morgan Park, Mount
Greenwood and Washington Heights.
Population shifts in this area for the past ten years have been
quite significant.
become 68.67% black.

Auburn-Gresham was .2% black in 1960; by 1970 it had
Washington Heights was 12.5% black in 1960; by

1970 the black population had grown to 74.66%.

From 1950 through 1970,

Beverly and Mount Greenwood remained less than 1% black.

Morgan Park on

the other hand, experienced a change from 35% to 47% black population
for the same period.
From an economic standpoint, Beverly and Mount Greenwood (both
of which are entirely in the 19th ward even today) are numbered among
the top five communities in terms. of aver.age family income.

The percen-

tages of families in these areas that are earning more than $10 ,000
annually are 79.26% and 72.01% respectively.

Both of these areas are

55

7TH, 14TH, 19TH AND 31ST WARD BOUNDARIES:

Source:
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predominantly Irish-Catholic, and nearly a quarter of the residents attended four or more years of college.

Only Hyde Park had a higher

percentage of residents attending college for four or more years (perhaps
related to the presence of the University of Chicago).
In

contrast~

the other three community areas have an average of

8.60% of the residents attending four or more _years of college and
62.35% make more than $10,000 annually.

It was no wonder then, that

after the new ward boundaries were drawn in 1970, the black population
of the 19th ward was only 7,714 and this maneuver was accomplished by
excluding all of Washington Heights and Auburn-Gresham.

There can be no

other possible explanation of this action than the one explained by
gerrymandering; in effect, the removal of these two community areas from
the 19th ward created two entirely 11 safe 11 wards for the Democratic Party
while preserving the number of established black wards.
gave the Democratic Party an
elect certain aldermen.

11

This action

unfair advantage 11 in terms of ability to

The creation of the 11 unfair advantage 11 is

directly in line with the very definition of gerrymandering that we
examined in Chapter II.

There are innumerable ways to redraw the

boundaries of the 19th ward and still remain within the parameters of
the "one man, one vote 11 concept, and yet, the one chosen happens to exclude two black communities.

One would be inclined to conclude that

this was more than just chance or coincidence.
The only way to·effectively_ accomplish this gerrymandering was
to place the black population in a ward that would not affect the
machine 1 s control in the area.

The 34th ward, which originally was
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located on the Near North Side, was moved to the South Side, and the
area around the 19th ward was redrawn to include this relocated ward.
The blacks that were removed from the 19th ward were placed in the

34th

and 21st wards with the greater part of the land mass (about 75%) and
the corresponding population placed in the 34th ward.

The area that was

covered by the 34th ward was already an all black area and under machine
control.

It was a matter of routine for the machine to elect black

Alderman Wilson Frost.

The election of Frost, president pro tern of the

City Council and a key black leader in the machine, placed the entire
area under complete machine domination.
Had the machine not moved the blacks into the already black area
that was to become the 34th ward, the black population of the 19th ward
would have been 26,008.

In effect then, the function served by the

gerrymandering of the 19th ward was to keep the level of blacks at the
1960 mark and contain them in one area (the 34th ward), thereby preventing them from possibly gaining two wards in terms of representation.
Since the entire next chapter involves a detailed study of the
Federal Court of Appeals' findings on the alleged gerrymandering of the
31st ward, I will limit discussion of the ward to the data found in the
1960 and 1970 census that pertains to the population of this area.

As

previously noted, the term I have given to the action of gerrymandering
in the case of the 31st ward is "dispersal."
effort to

11

It involves a conscious

scatter 11 a particular population (in a political sense) by

dissecting the community's boundaries with ward boundaries.

By separating

the particular ethnic community into several different wards, it is
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possible to keep any ethnic consciousness expressed through the ballot
from resulting in the election of a representative of the ethnic group
in question.
Before the 1970 census, the 31st ward was primarily composed of
Humboldt Park and West Town.

The total Spanish-speaking population of

the 31st ward in 1960 was 28,795.11

If the ward boundaries had remained

the same, the 1970 Spanish-speaking population of the 31st ward would
have numbered 60,022.

However, after the 1970 redistricting, the present

Spanish-speaking total is 22,022.

(No conversion factor was necessary

because the city of Chicago has published an up-to-date census of the
Spanish-speaking in the city by ward.)
The change in the ward boundaries in the 31st enabled the machine
to limit the Spanish-speaking to approximately one-third of the total
ward population. This effort, however, created the problem of where to
place the remaining Latinos.
east of the 31st.

The 26th ward is located directly South-

The alderman is Stanley M. Zydlo, a Regular Democrat.

In 1960, the Spanish-speaking represented 4.8% of the total population
of the 26th ward .. In 1970 they were 32.5% of the ward's population--a
politically non-important factor in the case of majority rule when faced
with ethnic voting patterns).

In 1960, the 32nd ward had a Spanish-

speaking population of 4.89% and the 33rd had only 0.22%.

These wards

11 The figures for the Spanish-speaking community are not taken
from the Local Community Fact Book as are all the figures for the black
population. Rather, they are taken from an updated census made by the
City of Chicago. Because they are listed by ward arid not community area
as are the black population figures, the transformation from community
to ward is unnecessary and therefore the conversion factor is not employed.
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are represented by Terry M. Gabinski and Tex Sande, both of whom are
members of the Regular Democratic Party.

By 1970 the Spanish-speaking

totals had grown to 25.5% and 18.6%, respectively.

City-wide in the

same ten-year period, the Spanish-speaking population of Chicago had
increased 125%.

And yet, in these three wards, the population increased

anywhere from 800% to 900%.

In the 33rd ward, the population went from

156 Spanish-speaking to 12,483.
Why was it advantageous to the machine's position to engineer a
move of this nature, and more importantly, why move them to 26, 32 and
33? The large concentration of Spanish-speaking in the area of the 31st
ward endangered the re-election of one of the key members of the machine,
Alderman Thomas Keane.

(Keeping in mind the machine policy discussed

in Chapters IV and the beginning of V, which involves appealing to a
homogeneous community, the difficulty in Keane's ward was a result of
the triforcation of the community--white ethnics, blacks and now
latinos.)

Even if this was not uppermost among the concerns of the

mayor, it certainly would have been expected to bother Keane and as chief
architect of the redistricting plan, he was in a position to do something
about it.
Why this particular maneuver occured becomes more apparent when
viewed from the perspective of the entire redistricting that took place
that year.

Specifically, in terms of both the 19th ward and the 31st

ward, the machine felt that a change was necessary.
quite different.

The problems were

In 19 what was needed was an addi ti anal ward where the

black population could be contained, while in 31 what was needed was the
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correct number of wards which would allow the dissection of the Spanishspeaking community to keep it from establishing a majority in any ward
and thereby retaining machine control over the area.
It appears that the answer to both of these problems was the
34th ward.

By removing it from the Northwest Side, the machine was able

to take the remaining four ward (31, 26, 32 and 33--all of which are and
were ma chine-dominated wards) and rearrange their boundaries so th at
each one of these loyal machine wards received a portion of the potentially dangerous Latin community.

The choice of these wards was logical

in that they were all within a reasonable distance of the center of the
Spanish-speaking community and were already machine-dominated.

Besides

the obvious advantage of moving the 34th ward to keep the 31st ward
11

safe 11

,

the maneuver also provided the addition al advantage of the pre-

viously discussed 19th ward maneuver.
Obviously, there is no better ward to examine in detail at this
point than the one that "belongs" to the man who redrew the ward boundaries in the city;

the 31st ward of Alderman Thomas Keane. 12

12The research for this analysis covers an era when Thomas Keane
was alderman of the 31st ward. Since that time he was forced to give up
his office after his conviction in federal court for mail fraud and
comspiracy. In the 1975 Aldermanic Elections in Chicago, Thomas Keane's
wife won the election and now represents the 31st ward.

I''

I

CHAPTER VI
THE 31ST WARD:

A CASE STUDY

The main reason for the focus on the 31st ward involves Alderman
Thomas Keane.

If one assumes that gerrymandering is designed to aid a

particular party or its members, the logical place to look for evidence
of gerrymandering would be in those areas where the leading party members enjoy control.

As

cited in Chapter II I of this paper, Thomas Keane

has proven to be the second most influential man in the Democratic Party
in Chicago (second only to Richard J. Daley).

Thus, his home ward would

be a logical beginning point for an investigation of this nature.
One would expect that if gerrymandering were to take pl ace,
certainly those responsible for the redistricting would have to be part
of the gerrymandering effort.

It is not unreasonable then, to examine

the actions and impute possible motives for the manner in which ward
boundaries were redrawn.

Not only did Thomas Keane have the opportunity

to affect a change of any nature he desired by virtue of his role as the
Chairman of the special subcommittee commissioned to present a suitable
reapportionment of the city, but he also possessed the political knowledge and contacts necessary to achieve a goal such as gerrymandering.
A second reason for closer examination of the 31st ward involves
the litigation that resulted from the alleged gerrymander.

In the court

battle that fol lowed the al legations of gerrymandering in the city, two
63
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wards were central to the entire discussion:

the 7th ward which was

ordered redrawn on the grounds of gerrymandering {although it was later
returned to its original boundaries after a series of appeals), and the
31st ward which was not ordered redrawn at all.
Before pursuing this line of thought with all its implications,
it is necessary to examine the physical aspects of the ward and the
population composition in order to understand the profitabi 1ity of gerrymanderi ng.
On September 28th, 1961, a map containing the ward boundaries of
the City of Chicago was entered into the municipal code along with the
descriptions of the individual wards.

The map was presumably based on

the population changes noted by the 1960 United States Census data.

Of

particular interest to the people on the Northwest Side of the city were
the new ward boundaries of the 31st ward.

The alderman at this time was

Thomas Keane.1 The ward that Keane represented since he was first elected in 1945 began at the intersection of Chicago and Western Avenues.
It proceeded north on Western Avenue until it intersected with North
Avenue, where it turned west.

It continued west on North Avenue until

Pulaski Road; turning south on Pulaski where it returned to Chicago Avenue.

The ward then continued east on Chicago until it returned to the

point of origin.

Obviously, the ward was a compact rectangle incorpora-

ting a fairly contiguous piece of property.
lThis map resulted from the city ordinance adopted on September
28th, 1961 as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 4-64.
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On November 6th, 1970, a map containing the 11 new 112 ward boundaries of the City of Chicago followed the same filing process.

Again,

it was of parti cu1ar interest to the people on the Northwest Si de to
note the proposed new boundaries of the 31st ward.

Section 4-44 of the

Municipal Code (amended) outlines these new boundaries.
An examination of these two sets of boundaries (see maps on
pages 55 and 56) leads to two observati ans.

The first is that the re-

sulting western edge of the proposed new ward was seven blocks farther
west than the corresponding boundary on the 1961 map.

The second obser-

vation is that the eastern edge of the ward resembles a drain pipe in
its new and contorted form, while the previous boundary formed a simple
right angle.
tigation.

Perhaps at first there appears no need for further inves-

However, considering the new ward and its changed boundaries

in light of census data which indicates an increase of Spanish-speaking
at the eastern edge of the ward and a predominance of "white ethnics 11 3
at the western edge (38.8% foreign stock in the community area, 93.2?; of
whom live i.n the western one-third of the ward4 ), there is reason enough
2The map that resulted from this ordinance was adopted by the
Chicago City Council as Municipal Code of Chicago, Sections 4-13 to 464 amended, November 6th, 1970.
3The term "white ethnics" is used in the manner of Weber as he
described this need for human collectivity based on an assumption of
common origin, real or imaginary, Max Weber, The Ethnic Group, in Talcott
Parsons, et al. Theories of Society, Vol. 1,p. 305 (Glencoe, Ill.: The
Free Press, 1961)
4All data and statistics concerning the nature and size of the
populations analyzed in this study are taken from E. M. Kitagwa and P. M.
Hauser~ Local Community Fact Book (Chicago:
Chicago Community Inventory,
1950, 1960, 1970)

66
to investigate this redrawing further.
Humboldt Park (which is the community area corresponding to the
western edge of the 31st ward) has approximately 15.5% Spanish-speaking
while West Town (which is the eastern edge) has a Spanish-speaking population of 39.09%.

In 1960, two-thirds of the 31st ward was in West Town

and only one-third in Humboldt Park.

In 1970, however, the order was

reversed and now two-thirds of the 31st ward's population lives in Humboldt Park.
Despite the increase in Spanish-speaking in West Town, the total
population of the area decreased by ten per cent.
illustrate one constant factor:

The figures and maps

in 1960 the Spanish-speaking were seven-

teen per cent of the total ward population; in 1970, there was a
significant increase in this population.

It was so significant that

even after the ward was moved nearly a mile farther from the center of
the Spanish-speaking community, it still comprised thirty-three per cent
of the ward's population.

Even without examining the registration rates

and voting patterns of minorities, in_ numerical consideration alone, the
Spanish-speaking remain a political minority in the 31st ward despite
their growth in numbers in the general area.
From an evaluation of census data and figures and maps supplied
by the Department of Development and Planning of the City of Chicago,
the approximate central point of the Spanish-speaking community lies at
the intersection of Division and Western Avenues (see map on following
page).

Not only is a portion of the 31st ward's boundaries part of this

intersection, but it also serves as part of the boundaries for three
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other wards.

The 34th ward, which was located in the same general area

before and after the 1960 reapportionment, was moved to the South Side
after the 1970 reapportionment and used to incorporate the black area
surrounding the 19th ward.

(See argument offered in Chapter V.)

After

the removal of the 34th ward, the expansion and reorganization of the
remaining wards was possible.

The remaining four wards were restructured

in such a manner as to separate the Spanish-speaking into different
political subdivisions, thereby keeping them from gathering in any one
particular ward.
This action, which I have termed "dispersal," is the opposite of
the "confinement" action taken in the previously discussed wards.

In 7,

14 and 19 the object was to combine black areas and separate them from
the white areas to facilitate the election or re-election of machine
candidates.

By sectioning off the black areas the machine was able to

plan election strategy with a more homogeneous electorate in mind.

In

my estimation, this action was necessary because of the large numbers of
people that had to be dealt with.

In the case of the Spanish-speaking,

their numbers do not warrant any action that would cause the machine to
relinquish its power in the area and allow the election of a latin.

Yet

they do constitute a large enough group to cause possible election battles.

The machine's response was to divide the community up into

"controllable" numbers and separate it poli ti ca lly.
The community at large had a response of its own.
the form of legal recourse.

It came in

I have already stated that the judicial

branch, on all levels, has taken the most definitive stand in terms of

69
dealing with gerrymandering, but because of the indeterminate nature of
gerrymandering, it has been difficult to adjudicate the alleged practice.
There was a particularly important case concerning gerrymandering in
Chicago (i.e., the response of the community at large).

The case deals

with six specific instances of gerrymandering with reference to nearly a
dozen more occurrences as well as a stated position dealing with the
effect on the entire city.

The center of the review is the 31st ward.

Cousins v City Council of Chicaqo5 was brought to remedy alleged
racial and ethnic gerrymandering in the reapportionment of Chicago's
wards in 1970.

The case was filed in December, 1970 and brought immedi-

ately to trial.

At the conslusion of the first trial (in Chicago's

Court), judgment was entered in favor of the defendants (The City
Council, Mayor Richard J. Daley, and the Chicago Board of Election Cammi ss i one rs).

Subsequent to this decision, the p 1ainti ffs--the Independent

Voters of Illinois (a subsidiary group of the parent organization, Americans for Democratic Action, an organization engaged in political
campaigning and fund raising for "independent-minded" candidates),
Committee for an Effective City Council (an ad hoc committee organized
by civic-minded citizens to prepare the charges against the defendants
and to raise money for the court battles) and some twenty individuals-appealed the ruling.

After being notified of the court's decision to

remand the case for retrial before a different judge, the defendants took
recourse in filing for a writ of certiorari.

The plaintiffs claimed that

5cousins v City Council of Chicago, 73-1891; 73-2127, 7th cir.
( 1971)

I,
I II
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citations in the filing were

11

clearly erroneous. 11 6

The United States

Supreme Court denied petition for the writ.
Subsequent to the Court's denial (which took place on May 25th,
1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
the person of the Honorable Thomas R. McMillen, issued the Decision and
Order7 finding only the 7th ward in the City of Chicago had been drawn
so as to discriminate against a minority.

To remedy the situation, he

ordered the ward redrawn and a special election held.

He failed to rule

on the 31st or any other ward in question.
According to a brief filed in the United States Court of Appeals
by Michael Shakman, another attorney for the plaintiffs, the trial judge
also found that the other wards had been drawn to exclude blacks and
Puerto Ricans or to ensure a white majority, but McMi llen refused to
order relief with respect to those wards because of a

11

of the proper rule of law to apply to his own findings.

misapprehension
118

The suit filed by these groups and individuals charged that the
city had been gerrymandered in its entirety.
wards' theory in Chapter V.)

(See discussion of

11

key 11

In lieu of the reapportionment of all of

the city's wards, the plaintiffs submitted a number of intermediary steps
they felt would remedy the most drastically gerrymandered wards.

On

61n a conversation with Alderman Dick Simpson in November of
1973, Simpson (as a principle in the litigation), used the term 11 clearly
erroneous 11 in relation to the grounds on which the defendants were filing for the Writ of Gerti orari. ·
7Appellate Court, 7th Cir., 446 F. 2d at 835

p. 20

8Plaintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council,
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August 10, 1973, the plaintiffs again filed a motion, 9 this time for an
injunction and an injunction pending appeal, in which they sought an
order foreclosing the City Council from proceeding with its announced
plans to reapportion all wards for the 1975 aldermanic and mayoral elections.

The responsibility for this new apportioning of the ward

boundaries would be placed in the hands of the same subcommittee that
produced the currently contested reapportionment of 1970.

This subcom-

mittee would undoubtedly be chaired by the same man who provoked most of
the controversy surrounding the initial claim of gerrymandering, Alderman
Thomas Keane.

In November of 1974, the Circuit Court finally ruled in

favor of the City Council and denied the motion for an injunction.
The central character in the entire controversy appears to be
Thomas Keane himself.

During the course of the trial, evidence the

plaintiffs submitted established the existence of what became known
as the "Secret Map. u 10 Testimony was given concerning the preparation
of a secret map in Alderman Keane's private law office, by a Keane aide
and three college student interns paid by the city.

This map was

surreptitiously used by Alderman Keane as the basis for the official map
he drew publicly at City Council Rules Committee meetings.

According to

Michael Shakman, " ••• the "Secret Map" and the discovery of its existence
9Appellate, 310, 313
10 For a detailed discussion of the "Secret Map" see the 2nd
Plaintiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal
Appellate Court for the 7th Circuit.
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during the first trial was like an episode out of Perry Mason. 11
11

The trial court found that in drawing the 31st ward on the
11

Secret Map,

11

Edward Bell (Keane's aide),

..• resisted the inclusion of additional blacks or Puerto Ricans
in the new ward by keeping it as far west as was feasible. We
believe·that this was resumabl · in accordance with Keane's WTsh.12
Emphasis added.
This quote from the Court's own decision seems evidence enough that
gerrymandering for certain political reasons did in fact take place in
the 31st ward.
The plaintiffs went on to contend that since the actual 31st
ward on the enacted map was identical with the one on the Secret Map"
11

there was no way for Keane to escape responsibility for what Edward Bell
and the three college students had done.

Furthermore, they felt be-

cause Keane was acting in an official capacity as agent of the City
Council, the City Council must share the blarre for Keane's actions by
virtue of their tacit approval.

They substantiated their claim of the

relationship between Bell and Keane with additional evidence including
City Council records indicating that Edward Bell was paid by the city
and had acted as agent for Alderman Keane in several official actions
prior to this situation.13
11This comment made by Michael Shakman appears in the 2nd Plaintiffs Brief, filed in appeal of Cousins v City Council, Federal Appellate
Court for the 7th Circuit, p. 11
12Appellate ruling: App. #311
13The argument offered by the defendants indicated that they were
not contesting whether or not the actions were indeed politically motivated but rather if the initiation came from Keane or Bell himself.
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In response to the claim that the reapportionment of the 31st
ward was a discriminatory exclusion of Puerto Ricans, the City Council
argued that the change actually benefited the Spanish-speaking community
by increasing their population in the 26th ward.14 (By the city's own
figures, the per cent of the total population that was Spanish-speaking
after the reapportionment was 33.0% for the 31st ward and 32.5% for the
26th ward.)

Despite the fact that the resulting populations of Spanish-

speaking in these two wards were practically identical, there is no
evidence indicating that the Spanish-speaking population that was excluded from the 31st ward was transferred to the 26th ward as the city
claimed.

In fact, the evidence I presented in Chapter Vindicates that

the Latinos were dispersed among three wards (26, 32, and 33).

There

was no testimony in any of the three court cases explaining that this
11

benefi ci ent gerrymander" was to help the Spanish-speaking constitute a

majority or even a sizeable minority somewhere else.

If indeed this was

the object, the logical course would have been to gather them in the
ward already containing the highest proportion of Spanish-speaking, that
is, the 31st ward.

The only mention of any such action by the City Coun-

14while in effect the Spanish-speaking population of the 26th
ward was increased by the action taken by Keane, one must view the
overall results of the action as a whole. The total population of
Spanish-speaking in the 26th ward became over 32% as a result of the redistricting; an overall increase of some 28%. However, all five wards
in the immediate area with any noticeable Spanish-speaking population
increased as a result of ethnic migration patterns. The ever present
factor of no one ward with more than 33% Spanish-speaking is still vital
to the consideration at hand. One can not ignore or blame coincidence
for the fact that in a predominantly Spanish-speaking area of the city,
the geo-political boundaries manage to dissect the community in such a
manner as to develop five wards, none of which have close to a majority
of Spanish-speaking.
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cil was in the brief filed by the Council's attorneys in response to the
appeal entered by the plaintiffs.15 The plaintiffs argued that the city's
attorneys were making

11

•••

a blatant effort to concoct an after-the-fact

justification for the unconstitutional discrimination practiced by the
City Council and Alderman Keane. 11 16 The plaintiffs were granted an
appeal in the case; once again the emphasis was almost entirely on the
31st ward.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants in the first
appeal based on the distinction between discrimination with respect to
the larger community (the entire Spanish language group) and discrimination in terms of the particular (the Latin American minority).

The

court had ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to make a distinction
between the two and therefore left the court with questionable juri sdi cti on.

In the Court's words:

Furthermore, the evidence concerning the Spanish language group
reveals that although totalling about 80,000 persons, it contains
an unknown number of aliens and it is so scattered as to constitute
a minority in any ward, unless perhaps a special ward were to be
drawn to accommodate this group. We find and conclude that the
plaintiffs evidence concerning the Spanish language group is not
relevant to the pleadings or to the Court of Appeals mandate and in
any event fails to prove grounds for relief.17 (Emphasis added.)
There is legal precedent that questions the trial court's decision based on the point of citizenship.

The 14th amendment prohibits

15 city of Chicago, Defendants Brief filed in response to cousins
v City countil pp. 23-24
lt

16p1aintiffs Brief filed in appeal of Coosins ·v City·council,
p. 11

17Gornillion

v Lightfoot; 466 F. 2d at 841 {1970)
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discrimination against·petsons, it does not limit the scope of jurisdiction to citizens.18
In the first appeal the court denied relief because there was no
basis for jurisdiction in a case of this nature.

In the second appeal,

the emphasis was placed on two different aspects.
The star witnesses in one aspect of the second appeal were the
three college student interns hired by the city and subsequently involved
in drawing the 11 Secret Map 11 because of their assignment to Alderman
Keane.19

In the brief filed by the plaintiffs for their second appeal,

they claimed that to remedy the situation, it would be essential that an
independent agency of some nature would have to assume responsibility
for redrawing the ward boundaries.

Part of the reasoning applied to

this request (for the reapportionment function to be assigned to another
agency) was the consideration that in the future, Keane and the City
Council would not be foolish enough to hire college students who would
so quickly divulge potentially damaging information.
In response to the question of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs presented the opinion that the Court should use three rules of law in the
decision and order on the claim of gerrymandering.
lBsee, e.g., .Vick Wo v. Hopkins,

The first rule stated

118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)

19In the briefs and trial transcripts the mention of the college
students is listed as such: The three students and Professor Murray,
their supervisor. The explanation I was given by a clerk in the Federal
Building sounds plausible in that he stated that because of their youth
and unintentional involvement perhaps their names have been stricken from
the record.
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that·minority group·mertters·are protected from having ward boundaries
drawn to dilute or·minimize their voting strength; there should be no
requirement that the minority constitute a majority of ward members before the gerrymander.

In defense of this position they cited the case

of Gomillion v Lightfoot:

"When a legislature thus singles out a readily

isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment (gerrymandering), it violates the fifteenth amendment. 20
11

The second rule of law stated that to prove unlawful racial or
ethnic discrimination, it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove
that the dominant purpose of the defendants' action was discrimination.
In Wright v the Council of the City of Emporia, the Supreme Court recognized this principle.

The Court of Appeals had found that the primary

purpose of the city was beni-gn, and that it was not a cover-up for racial
discrimination.

But in the Wright case the Supreme Court had already

rejected the dominant purpose theory by stating:
This "dominant purpose" test finds no precedent in our decisions.
It is true that where an action by school authorities is motivated
by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the existence of that
purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of the action by intensifying the stigma of implied racial inferiority •.. it is difficult
for the court to determine the "sole" or "dominant" motivation behind
the choice of a group of legislators ••• thus we have focused on the
effect and not on the purpose or motivation ••. the existence of a permissibl21purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible
effect.
(Emphasis added.)
This Supreme Court decision appears to reject the position assumed by the first trial judge when he claimed that Alderman Keane's

(1972)
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action was not intentional, and it was therefore permissible.
The third rule of law that the plaintiffs felt was necessary to
achieve proper adjudication in this case is that even if racial or ethni t discrimination is the product of a variety·of
unlawful.

rnotiviations~

it is

In reversing a lower court decision in the case of Smith v

Adler Realty Company, the Supreme Court held:

"it (race) cannot be

brushed aside because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination
nor the total factor of discrimination.

We find no acceptable place in

law for partial discrimination. 22
11

These three rules of law offered by the plaintiffs were intended
to be applied to the actions of the defendants.

However, there was one

defendant which claimed no part in the action whatsoever.

The Chicago

Board of Election Commissioners, in a brief filed by its attorney,
Thomas Foran, contended that the board is charged with the administration
of election laws concerning the aldermen in the City of Chicago and not
with the way in which those laws come into being.

Foran claimed " ... it

is not the responsibility of the Board, under law, to determine the location of the City's wards and their boundaries ••• as such, the Board is a
neutral party ••• (and) ..• merely awaits the directions of the Court, if
any. 1123
In spite of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the case,
22smith

v Adler Realty·company, 436 F. 2d at 344

(1970)

23Brief and Argument of Defendant Appel lee, Board of Election
Commissioners of the City of Chicago in response to·cousirts·v·city
council, p. 3

.
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the Court refused to order remedy in the area of the 31st ward, and subsequently, it remains the same as it was on the Secret Map.
11

11

The Court

found that the action of the defendants was politically motiviated, yet
no relief was granted because whether or not the gerrymander had taken
place, the Spanish-speaking would not have managed a politically potent
majority.

Based on the logic presented by the Court in its decision,

one would have to conclude that gerrymandering is an acceptable practice
if the minority in question couldn't win an election whether the gerrymander took place or not.

(Perhaps, under this same logic, euthanasia

is legal as well as moral to the extent that whatever may be done, the
patient will eventually die.)
In its ruling the Appellate Court states:
The ward (31st) ended up with 25% Puerto Ricans (not including other
Spanish-speaking persons) and 1.4% blacks. Had it boundaries been
moved east or north to include more blacks or Puerto Ricans, the
dominant majority would still have remained overwhelmingly as before.
We find and conclude that the consideration for the shape and boundaries of the 31st ward were primarily political and that the failure
to include certain areas of blacks and Puerto Ricans caused them no
discernible loss of voting strength.24 (Emphasis added.)
These two considerations (where the emphasis is added in the
Court's ruling above) conflict with the precedent set by the Supreme
Court concerning the
this chapter).

11

dominant purpose" test (as discussed earlier in

The focus, as the Court stated, should be placed on the

action taken, that is that the consideration for the shape of the ward
was indeed "primarily political." The Appellate Court's decision was
questionable in this regard:

if the ward boundaries were moved seven

24oecision and Order of July 11, 1973, Appellate Court Ruling,
App. 310-311
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blocks east instead of seven blocks

west~

the Spanish-speaking popula-

tion of the 31st ward would have been 39.6%, and the black population
would have been 4.5%.

Because the court was compelled to combine these

two ethnic groups to form one minority factor, I feel equally compelled
and submit that when they are combined and measure 44.1% of the total
population that this figure is indeed quite discernible from the 26.4%
that results from the Keane redistricting.

Considering the 31st ward

in light of the "dominant purpose" theory as well as the results of the
minority movement (an action apparently not taken by the appellate
court), the conclusion becomes an obvious one.
The evidence clearly points to the consideration that the 31st
ward was indeed gerrymandered for "primarily political 11 reasons.

The

Court's decision does not reflect this evidence and in itself may reflect a "political influence" of another sort.
speculate on this point.

At best, we can only

Regardless of the Court's reasons for ruling

in favor of the defendants, it remains to be seen whether or not future
cases of gerrymandering wil 1 test the fiber of our legal system.

In

any case, it is our social system that experiences the brunt of this
kind of activity.

The consequences of gerrymandering borne of primarily

political ends certainly have great social implications, a subject to
which we will now turn.

CHAPTER VII
CONSEQUENCES OF A GERRYMANDER
How successful was the attempt at limiting the political power
of the Spanish-speaking and black minorities in Chicago? As with most
questions of this nature, the answer depends on one's perspective.
While both sides of this confrontation may have reason to celebrate, it
is clear that the anti-gerrymandering forces have felt the full force
of Chicago's "machine power.

11

There is one aspect of the entire debate that is obvious because
of its absence.

It was not the Spanish-speaking or black communities

per se that engaged the battle with the machine; rather, it was the socal led independent influence in Chicago that again challenged the machine.
One is faced with the realization that, until these communities begin to
organize and develop a mode of participation, any question of fair and
equitable representation may be purely academic.

One cannot assume that

electing black or Latin representatives in Chicago is going to cure the
ills of their communities, but from a practical political approach, it
would give them that a11 important foot in the door.
The purpose of these past pages has been to acquaint the reader
with the relevant information concerning gerrymandering and its different forms and different manifestations in Chicago.

The data and

explanations so far supplied have only identified the nature of the pro80
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blem and its relation to the source of power in Chicago.

To fully com-

prehend the implications of a political and social action like gerrymandering, the action must be considered in light of its relationship to
the source of power that it depends on for its existence.

That is to

say, without the power of the machine in Chicago, gerrymandering would
not be possible to the extent I have described.

While the ability to

gerrymander appears dependent on holding political power, the converse
is not necessarily true.

We have to take this concept one step further

and ask two questions about the machine's power even without the aid of
gerrymandering.

First, if the ward boundaries had been drawn in compli-

ance with Baker v Carr, would there be any assurance that these
mi nori ti es would or could elect their own representatives to the Chicago
City Council? Second, would the election of one or two or even five
representatives damage the machine's power?
In ans\·1er to this first question, it is inequitable to deal with
the very nature of representation on a 11 what if 11 basis.

Certainly what

we are concerned with is the opportunity and not assurances.

It is in

the guarantee of minority rights that the fundamental elements of American democracy are embedded.
the XXVII amendments

hav~

The XIII, XIV, XV, XXIV and perhaps soon

repeatedly recalled the rights of the individual

to his or her vote in our democracy.

Nowhere in the Constitution of the

United States, or for that matter in any interpretation of it, is there
a passage that specifically assures that minorities will have a voice in
government by virtue of their right to vote.

They too have the right to

cast their vote where they see fit, even though it may not be for a
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minority representative.

The question remains, however, not who they

may vote for, but rather who are they kept from voting for?
With the first question restated in this manner we are logically
confronted with the second question:

Would the election of a handful of

minority representatives to the Chicago City Council endanger the control that the machine now enjoys?

If gerrymandering in Chicago takes

away the minorities' ability to vote for a particular person, and if
this is accomplished by the machine's direct intervention, then the
minorities in Chicago are being denied the rights guaranteed by law and
tested in the courts.
It may appear as if the use of gerrymandering in Chicago is the
sole element of the machine's power.

I doubt that an end to gerryman-

dering and the reapportionment of the wards in line with Baker v Carr
would cause the machine to crumble immediately.

However, without the

ability to gerrymander in order to protect the re-election efforts of
certain machine aldermen, the effectiveness of the machine could be
severely hampered.

The role that gerrymandering plays as an important

tool for the maintenance and enhancement of the machine in Chicago could
not easily be replaced.

Even beyond this question of the machine's

future one must ask if the use of gerrymandering does affect the quality
(and perhaps the very existence) of minority representation in Chicago,
and what are the consequences of this use in terms of the machine's
desire for preservation and enhancement?
In light of the !W_ of questions that need be asked (i.e., questions that deal with consequences primarily of social significance), the

-83

most advantageous way of examining these questions is through a process
that will scrutinize their social implications.

Functional analysis,

which was at one time primarily a technique employed in anthropological
research of social and cultural differences, has been adapted by social
scientists like Mertonl to establish the social consequences of actions
in terms of their relationship to the system attempting to implement
them.
In Robert K. Merton's development of the conceptual scheme of
functional analysis, he presents four concepts that are fundamental to
an approach of this nature. 2 The first involves an awareness of the
function that a social action serves.

The second consideration involves

an awareness of the process through which this function is eventually
realized.

The third aspect of the conceptual scheme lies in the direc-

tion of the unanticipated consequences of a social action, and the
fourth consideration is of "those observed consequences which lessen the
adaptation or adjustment of the system. 3 The dysfunction that Merton
11

speaks of in his fourth consideration may lead to interference with the
system's accomplishments or may lead to an eventual structural change
of the sys tern.
In Peter M•. Blau's study of bureaucracy4 he organizes his data
lRobert K. Merton~ Sotial Theory and·sotial ·structure (reved.;
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) pp_. 19-84
2 Ibid.

3 Ibi d.

4Peter M. Bl au~· The Dyrtami ts ·of Bureaucracy ( reved.; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963)
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along the paradigm developed by Merton.

Blau defines function as an ob-

served consequence of social patterns.5 The social patterns that we
are dealing with in this analysis of gerrymandering are heavily imbued
with the influence of a definite machine-dominated political system.
There is no doubt then that the consequences of social patterns so imbued would be an effort to maintain and/or enhance this machinedominated system.

In keeping with Merton's paradigm and Blau's appli-

cation, the consequences realized through these social patterns are
observable in terms of both their 11 manifest 11 (the designed outcome of
social action) and their 11 1atent 11 (unintended consequences of a social
action) natures.
One of the major manifest consequences realized through gerrymandering involves the previously discussed methods of enacting a gerrymander in Chicago.

The containment and dispersal strategies the machine

employs permit it to organize the composition of the electorate in the
city's wards in such a fashion as to create 11 safe 11 districts for the reelection of machine aldermen (see Chapter V).
By this same process, limiting the number of 11 minority 11 and/or
11

independent 11 aldermen who could possibly challenge machine control could

be achieved.

Both of these intended consequences involve an effort to

quantitatively destroy the vote power of these minorities.

Through this

effort another consequence, which may or may not be the intended object
of the machine, must be examined.

I refer here to the racial overtones

Speter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (reved.; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963)
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of gerrymandering.

Because the reapportionment was conducted in closed
11

session, 11 one can only impute possible racial motivations behind the reapportionment described in Chapter V and VI of this study.
distinct possibilities are left.
borne of racial prejudice.

Three

First the machine's action was one

This line of reasoning is altogether too ex-

treme in reference to this aspect of political life in Chicago.

Although

many political actions are spawned of intense hatred for a particular
ethnic or racial group, there is no empirical evidence to prove that
gerrymandering was a result of this.

A second possibility is that blacks

and lattnos were identified by the machine as potential challengers and
as such were 11 dealt with 11 as all other challengers have been (e.g. reform
clubs and Independents).

While this approach seems more in line with

the past performance of the machine, one cannot entirely rule out the
possibility of killing two birds with one stone. Which presents the
third possibility, that these two approaches were the impetus for the
gerrymandering in Chicago.

While the main reason behind gerrymandering

in Chicago was indeed political, it would be unrealistic to assume that
gerrymandering did not involve certain racial overtones.

One must keep

in mind that New York successfully gerrymandered the Democrats out of
the 15th district, regardless of race or ethnic origin, and Chicago's
gerrymander did single out two readily identifiable ethnic groups.
In examining the manifest consequences of gerrymandering {prirnari ly the creation of 11 safe 11 wards), the effects in terms of political
power at the ward level should be noted.
An analysis of the 1970 ward map i.ndi cates that there are fifteen

--86
wards which contain a mixture of both black and white constituents.
These wards lie on the border between the.all black areas of the city
and the all white areas.

There are eleven of these "border" wards where

b1acks are in a minority and only four "border" wards where whites are
in a minority.
The number of blacks who would be placed in a minority position
in these eleven wards totals 151,628.

The number of whites in a corres-

ponding position would be 43,359, a difference of over one hundred
thousand people who are placed in a relatively powerless position because
this benefits the election of more readily "controlled" candidates.
Scattering the Spanish-speaking as described in the previous chapter (in
terms of political location) produced similar results.
By separating the Spanish-speaking into different wards, the
first consequence of the action of gerrymandering (i.e., the creation of
11

safe 11 wards) is realized; even if they wished to vote against a machine

candidate they are numerically insufficient to elect their own representative.

(See discussion in Chapter V.)

The action of gerrymandering

quantitatively defines the electoral power of the Spanish-speaking after
the fact, for while they may be gathered in great numbers in tenns of
their community location, they are scattered politically in terms of
their ward location.
Another direct consequence of gerrymandering!> which may very well
be a product of the production of safe wards, involves minimizing potential opposition.

It stands to reason that for every safe ward produced

as a result of gerrymandering there exists one less ward with the paten-
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tial to produce an anti-machine representative.

In the examination of

the four wards in this study there were an additional eight wards considered because of their role as recipient of the displaced populations.
11

11

Seven of these eight wards are traditionally machine dominated (the
exception being the 5th ward).

After the populations were placed in

these seven wards, the election results indicated that they remained
machine dominated.

At no time did the populations moved into these seven

wards constitute greater than one-third of the ward s total population.
1

By limiting the opportunity for opposing groups to constitute a majority
in any of these seven wards, the machine has continued its domination in
those areas.
These manifest consequences are obvious.

Where the possibility

of a loss of machine control existed, the policy of gerrymandering was
employed to aid in strengthening this control.

In the case of the all

black areas, the wards were structured in such a way as to limit the
number of possible minority aldermen by placing blacks in a minority
position in the eleven border wards.
Since election results for these wards indicate continued
machine dominance, there is evidence that gerrymandering did achieve
the goals the machine appeared to have set.

However, because one cannot

conclude that these candidates would have lost if the gerrymandering had
never taken place, the·extent of the role of gerrymandering is somewhat
ill-defined. While gerrymanderi_ng may appear to be a necessary cause
for continued machine dominance, it can in no way be construed as a
sufficient cause.
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While the manifest consequences of this social action of gerrymandering appear to flow, one from the other, the latent consequences
seem to be somewhat antithetical to each other (at least in terms of
their effect on the machine's power).

Because gerrymandering has all

but closed the elective input channels, minority groups are forced to
seek relief in other areas.

Possible relief for the desire for repre-

sentation can be vented in appointive positions.

The machine certainly

did not intend to create the demand for these appointive positions; it
was not its intention to force the resurgence of ethnic consciousness
that spearheaded these demands.
Once the Spanish-speaking were locked out of elective positions
because of their minority position in Chicago's wards, they were forced to
seek alternative methods.

There remains a great deal of question regard-

ing the role the machine actually played in the success of this alternative venture.

Perhaps it was only coincident to closing the elective

channels, but nonetheless, the Mayor simultaneously began appointing a
number of Spanish-speaking individuals to fill administrative positions. 6
Key to the question of the Mayor's motivation in appointing
Spanish-surnamed individuals is the machine's track record in other areas
of federal pressure.

Currently, the federal government brought litigation

to force the City of Chicago to hire policemen on a quota system.

In

response to this pressure, the city originally refused to comply with
61n a conversation with Ruben Cruz on April 26, 1976, columnist for
the Chicago Sun-Times, the question of these appointments was raised. It
is his opinion, as a leader in the Latin Community, that in the last five
or six years Mayor Daley has succumbed to pressure by the Spanish-speaking
community by appointing members to key positions in the city. These impressions, while supported by other Latin leaders, have not been substantiated by any other empirical data.
·
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the federal government's order, prompting the government to withhold
federal revenue sharing funds. 7 The city has filed four appeals in the
case and continues to battle the federal government's decision to this day.
Obviously, the city has not succumbed to federal government
pressure in this area of minority hiring, so ti does not seem logical to
assume that in an area that does not have the millions of dollars at
stake (as does police hiring), that the city would give in to less pressure.
In an across-the-board analysis of minority hiring in government,
5.4% of the Spanish speaking in the United States are in government
service of some nature. 8 Among the six major urban centers with a substantial Spanish-speaking population, only Miami has fewer Spanishspeaking in government than Chicago.

These statistics reflect the highly

limited role that the Spanish-speaking played in Chicago's city government, until five years ago when they became "conspicuously absent" (in
relation to the national picture) from government or government-related
positions.
What is the significance of this point in time?

Obviously,

gerrymandering is not a recent phenomenon, and certainly not a product
of the last three years.

Why then, if not in response to federal govern-

ment pressure, did the Mayor begin these appointments? A possible
?united States of America, et al v City of Chica o, 73c 2080
(and consolidated cases 1975
Bchicago Spanish-speaking Population: Selected Statistics, City
of Chicago Department of Development and Planning, September, 1973.
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explanation might be that with the most recent redistricting (and as
demonstrated in Chapter VI, the most blatant anti-Latin gerrymandering)
and the futile attempt of the Spanish-speaking community to elect Luis
Davila to the Illinois House of Representatives, the machine attempted
to fulfill its distributive policies by giving the Spanish-speaking a
share of the pie.

The most recent census figures indicated in terms of

sheer numbers, the Spanish-speaking corrununity had to be reckoned with.
This first 1atent consequence was a manifestation of ethnic
consciousness through the demand for recognition and representation.
Another possible latent consequence of the informal policy of gerrymandering may involve an action similar to other machine policies:

in the

attempt to organize the black areas of the city into a limited number
of wards, the unintended effect of stabilizing the community and containing black migration may have been realized.

The political signifi-

cance of this limiting of wards (discussed in Chapter V) through
containing black migration is that the "containment policy" itself produced two effects:

the first, the limiting of the number of black wards;

the second, achievement of racial 11 stability. 11
The effectiveness of gerrymandering in terms of racial "stability" (in the physical sense of the ward) is not empirically demonstratable.

However, there are certain factors, through functional analysis, that may
lead one to believe that_ gerrymandering does play a definite role in
shapi_ng this stability.
From 1960 through 1970, the black population in the city of
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Chicago increased by 150%. 9 During this same period the percentage of
people living in all white neighborhoods decreased by only t111enty-one
per cent.

These figures indicate the relative immobility of the black
"

population.

For the most part, it expanded in neighborhoods that were

already black and still remain black at this time. 10
There are certain actions that contribute to this {either by
intent or result) control of the black minorities.

Low and moderate in-

come and public housing facilities are almost exclusively built in black
areas in Chicago, ll and gerrymandering ward boundaries creates the geographic parameters of these areas.

Because the available housing is

only available in already established black areas, the majority of blacks
are forced to roove into these sections rather than elsewhere in the city.
Construction of highways and urban renewal projects tend to
create physical barriers that stem the movement of families from one
section of the city to another.

This is another instance where the in-

fluence of gerrymandering can be witnessed.

It is common practice to

draw ward boundaries along present physical barriers which in turn
reinforce the distinctions that already exist between racial and ethnic
groups.

This practice enables redistrictors to place highways, railroads

and natural elements in the path of demographic movement.
9E. M. Kitagwa and P. M. Hauser, Local Community Fact Book
(Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, 1950, 1960, 1970)
lODavid Protess, 11 Banfield 1 s Chicago Revisited, 11 Social Service
Review {June, 1974)
llGautreaux v CHA, 296 F. Sup. 907 {North Dist., Ill. 1969)

92

Under this closer scrutiny, what appeared to be a latent consequence of gerrymandering begins to take on the proportions of a manifest
consequence.

The most profound element of the latent aspects of this

consequence paradoxically seem to be the basis for the claim of their
manifest nature.
stability.

Specifically, I am referring to the question of

While it would appear that one could not guarantee that

population movement would remain stable as a result of informal policy,
the machine has been able to couple this policy with others in an
attempt to achieve a guarantee of this nature.

In effect then, what

originally was a latent consequence--the apparent stability of blacks
resulting from gerrymandering ward boundaries in Chicago--has been adopted
by the machine and turned into a "desirable" or manifest action of gerrymandering (i.e., the combination of informal policies that lead to the
physical stability of blacks in Chicago).
Some of these informal policies grow out of the experiences noted
in a changing neighborhood.

Among those who move may be members of the

machine who serve as precinct captains or in other capacities as machine
members.

If one is in the practice of receiving and granting favors from

a select group (such as the role that a machine captain plays), the
transformation from one ward organization to another may result in forfeiting certain perquisites previously granted.

These material induce-

ments may be sufficient to encourage a person to look for another home
in the same ward.

Even in the case where a person is not induced to move

because of the socio-psychological impact of a changing neighborhood, the
same influences may come to bear.
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If a gerrymandered ward outlines a particular ethnic or racial
community, and the inhabitants are induced by their role in the machine
to remain in that community, then the continued outlining of that community (through gerrymandering) may well mean the continued stability
of the community (in terms of the physical aspects).
In the drawing of ward boundaries to create all black wards, such
as the case of the 34th ward, machine domination may be viewed as preferable by the constituents.

In this case, it would be in the best

interests of those who share a preferred position with the machine to
remain in the ward.

By creating all black and all white wards, the

machine may be establishing added incentive for the black population in
Chicago to remain stable.

The political ramifications of this incentive

will most probably be noted in terms of electoral response.
The white community's response could be favorable electorally in
return for keeping the black population 11 in its place. 11 12 In this role
the machine would be seen as a 11 protector 11 by the white community.

For

the black community, the illusion of strength through numbers and physical proximity could result from this informal policy.

The separation of

the races, in conjunction with material inducements for remaining within
a predefined geo-political distinction (which is largely the result of
gerrymandering) could be viewed as sufficient cause for the black popu1ation remainfog somewhat stable.
previously discussed

(housi.ng~

Thi.s is not to say that the elements

physical barriers) do not play an impor-

12oavi d Protess ~ Banfield s Chicago Re vi sited,"· Sod al Service
Review (June, 1974)
11

1
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tant part; but rather that the stability factor as a latent-turnedmanifest consequence of gerrymandering supplies the necessary final
ingredient to make the entire package palatable.
Amidst all of these consequences lies the realization that the
multi-ethnic population of Chicago has resisted the "melting pot"
tendencies of cities with smaller and less diverse ethnic makeups.

This

resistance only made the role of the gerrymanderer more important in the
eyes of the Regular Democratic Organization's leadership.

As long as

ethnic differences are pronounced, it wi 11 be necessary for can di dates
to appeal to a wide range of groups.

Elections will depend upon the

effectiveness of the coalitions that form in favor of a particular
candidate and it will remain in the machine's interest to divide these
groups up into single entities to facilitate logrolling efforts by
initiating a specific appeal intended for a specific group.

As

long as

it is politically more desirable to separate these groups than to combine them, gerrymandering will be an important tool for machine maintenance.

.

.

CHAPTER VI II
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The element that lies at the very base of this analysis is the
definition of a machine as a political party with a virtual monopoly
over political resources which distributes tangible incentives for
votes. 1 It is from this definition that the entire study developed and
the role of gerrymandering was examined.

I think at this juncture we

can make some very important statements based on what has been thus far
examined.

Gerrymandering of itself does not make the Chicago machine a

"machine." Neither do patronage or ward as opposed to at-large elections.

Mayor Daley's ability to combine the roles of mayor and party

chairman has not made the machine what it is.

At least none of these

aspects has accomplished this on its own; each factor has contributed
to the continued success of the machine in Chicago.

Each has indicated

the presence of a machine in Chicago, and their perpetuation will most
likely insure the machine's continuance.
In a behaviorial analysis that examines one of these aspects in
particular (i.e., gerrymandering}, there should be some quantitative estimation of what impact the particular has had on the other aspects of
machine dominance.
1Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson~ ·city Politics (New York:
Random House,. 1966) p. 115
95
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The importance of gerrymandering among all the other indicators
of machine power lies in its accessibility and relative ease of implementation under machine dominance.

This is not to say that reform

cities do not gerrymander, but rather the conditions that exist in a
machine city allow the existing power structure to accomplish control
of minorities with relatively little fear of reprisal.
This element has initiated a self-perpetuating cycle in machinedominated Chicago.

To gerrymander effectively, it becomes almost

essential to have machine-type control.

To continue this machine con-

trol, the electorate must re-elect machine members.

A very effective

way of achieving this control is through gerrymandering.
This concept stands at the center of the entire discussion of
the role of gerrymandering.

In the text of this analysis we have estab-

lished the use of gerrymandering, its social as well as political
consequences and the correlation between its future existence and that
of the Chicago machine.

What of the extent of this correlation? The

answer to this is undeniably linked with the role of gerrymandering in
the methods used for ensuring re-election.
The first premise is tau to l ogi cal:

re-election is fundamental

to the continued existence of the machine.

The second premise is that

the primary mode for accomplishing this objective is through the control
of the apparatus of election; that is to say, the use of specific techniques {tools as it were) to ensure machine maintenance.

If re-election

{the first premise) is achieved through control of the electoral apparatus
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(the second premise) then the object, machine maintenance, will be
realized.
One way to measure the extent of this association is to examine
the process (the method of controlling the electorate), in terms of the
influence of gerrymandering.

The role of the machine precinct captain

in shaping the electoral habits of the citizenry has been documented in
numerous accounts. 2 The control captain's exhibit is heightened by a
variety of perquisites that enable them, as machine captains, to accomplish much more than their counterparts in reform cities (at least to
the extent that reform captains do not enjoy a virtual monopoly over
resources, and this allows for more viable competition by other parties
and their captains).
This type of control over the electorate is best accomplished
when stability (in terms of demographic movement) is achieved on the
ward and even on the precinct level.

While the ward is a political

distinction and in and of itself has no physically limiting characteristics, the influence exerted by ward officials and the attempt to maintain
11 face to face contacts with individual citizens 113 allows the machine to
11

keep its grip upon the voters. 114 What better way to keep this 11 grip 11

than to ensure a stable population by devising methods to keep it under
the control of the same individuals?

Gerrymandering, while separating

2Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics:
University of Chicago Press, 1937) p. 23
3Ibid. p. 23
4Ibid. p. 23

Chicago Model (Chicago:
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these groups from other groups also serves to keep them in approximately
the same area, thereby continually placing them under the control of the
same ward officials.
The traditional control of the black areas that Gosnell attributes to the success of the first Daley mayoral election is not the same
tradition that affects the Spanish-speaking in Chicago.

Without this

tradition of machine control, the orientation toward the Spanish-speaking
community (as exemplified by the study of the 31st ward) differs from
that used in the black areas inasmuch as it requires the dispersal
tactics previously discussed.

The effectiveness of this policy lies in

the successful scattering of the Spanish-speaking into four wards and
thereby preventing them from attaining the sheer numbers necessary for
rivaling the machine's power.
Both of these orientations significantly contribute to the
success of machine-style politics in Chicago.

It is vital to the under-

standing of the methods employed by the machine that one places the
entire scheme in perspective.

The Chicago machine's ability to gerry-

mander comes from its control over political resources (patronage and
other perquisites), its unrivaled elections (for the most part), the combination of the roles of mayor and party chairman, and the allegiance of
the non-white community.

Each one of these aspects of machine power is

directly linked with the machine's ability to control the minorities-·which ·has been largely the result of gerrymandering.

In other words,

while gerrymandering could not be effectively implemented without the
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aid of the machine, the machine in Chic.ago would have only limited
effectiveness without gerrymandering.
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